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The Article argues that the exterior design of a private single-family 
house is a First Amendment-protected expression for the inhabit-
ants. When a municipality applies aesthetic standards to regulate 
this expression, it must justify its regulation by establishing a 
substantial governmental interest; that interest must be advanced by 
application of narrowly and clearly defined standards. 
INTRODUCTION 
In January, 1991, Margaret P. Gilleo offended the aesthetic sensibili-
ties of the City of Ladue, Missouri by placing "an 8.5- by 11-inch sign 
in the second story window of her home stating, 'For Peace in the 
Gulf. "'1 The municipality responded by enacting an ordinance which, 
with ten exceptions, prohibited all signs; the ordinance was based largely 
on aesthetic concems.2 
• Associate Professor, Widener University Law School. B.A. Hope College, 
1968; J.D. University of Michigan Law School, 1972; LL.M. Temple University Law 
School, 1986. Thanks to my research assistant, Fred Karpf, Esq., Class of I 995, for 
doggedly tracking down unusual sources; his puzzlement over my requests never 
interfered with his professionalism in fulfilling them. 
I. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2040 (1994). 
2. The city was animated by a fear that the: 
proliferation of an unlimited number of signs ... would create ugliness, visual 
blight and clutter, tarnish the natural beauty of the landscape as well as the 
residential and commercial architecture, impair property values, substantially 
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Ms. Gilleo challenged the ordinance. The United States District Court, 
granting her motion for summary judgment, found that the ordinance 
violated the First Amendment.3 The Eighth Circuit agreed.4 And, on 
June 13, 1994, so did the Supreme Court which found, without dissent, 
that "[a] special respect for individual liberty in the home has long been 
part of our culture and our law ... ; that principle has special resonance 
when the government seeks to constrain a person's ability to speak 
there."5 The Court distinguished a municipality's "constant and 
unavoidable" need to regulate expressive uses of public forums from its 
"much less pressing" need to regulate a citizen's expressive use of her 
private house.6 
Although every court agreed that the municipality overreached itself 
in pursuing Ms. Gilleo's little sign, its pursuit was founded on what has 
become an acknowledged governmental interest: aesthetic regulation. As 
the Supreme Court characterized it in Gilleo, the municipality relied 
"squarely" on a "content-neutral justification for its ordinance" by 
claiming that it promoted "aesthetic values unrelated to the content of 
the prohibited speech."7 
This Article will discuss the application of legislatively-defined 
aesthetic values to the exterior design of a private single family house, 
arguing that such regulation is subject to a rigorous First Amendment 
review. Using the philosophy of architect Robert Venturi, this Article 
will argue that the exterior design of the single family house speaks on 
behalf of the inhabitants, expressing who they are and how they choose 
to live. The Article argues that the content of this expression is made 
as clearly as if written or spoken and is entitled to First Amendment 
protection. Any municipality seeking to restrict that expression under 
impinge upon the privacy and special ambience of the community, and may 
cause safety and traffic hazards to motorists, pedestrians, and children. 
Id. at 2041. 
3. 774 F. Supp. 1564 (D. Mo. 1991). 
4. 986 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1993). 
5. 114 S. Ct. at 2047 (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor filed a concurring 
opinion because she "would have preferred to apply our normal analytical structure in 
this case which may well have required us to examine this law with the scrutiny 
appropriate to content-based regulations." Id. at 2048. However, she joined the Court's 
opinion stating, "I agree with its conclusion ... that even if the restriction were content-
neutral, it would still be invalid .... " Id. 
6. Id. at 2047. 
7. Id. at 2042. Not every court has been willing to assume that such ordinances 
are content-neutral. See, e.g., Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 63 U.S.L.W. 2724 (8th Cir. 
1995), where the court found that another Missouri city's ordinance restricting the 
posting of political signs for ostensibly aesthetic-based reasons was content-based; was, 
therefore, subject to strict scrutiny; and, under that scrutiny, was invalid as imposing 
unconstitutional restrictions of First Amendment rights. 
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the guise of aesthetic regulation must establish a sufficiently substantial 
need to do so under narrow, clearly defined standards. 
Section I analyzes Gil/ea and the three Supreme Court decisions 
underlying it, decisions which dealt with a municipality's authority to 
regulate outdoor signs; each decision required at least a passing 
discussion of aesthetic values as a legitimate regulatory interest. Section 
II introduces Robert Venturi. Section III describes how the house itself, 
in its exterior design, is a form of speech for the people who inhabit it, 
a way of expressing who they are and how they choose to live. The 
house is a form of individual expression which, section IV argues, is 
entitled to First Amendment protection. Section V describes the genesis 
of aesthetic regulation and its threat to First Amendment values. Section 
VI suggests how those values can be protected from governmental 
intrusion, arguing for a constitutional architecture which accepts the 
value of variety in the exterior design of private single family houses. 
I. 
Ms. Gilleo's hanging of a little protest sign in the window of her 
house had Supreme Court support, even as to its placement. On May 
10, 1970, Harold Spence hung a United States flag from an upper floor 
window of his apartment which was located on private property.8 Mr. 
Spence used tape to attach a peace symbol to the 3 by 5-foot flag which 
he then hung upside down to protest the Cambodian invasion and the 
Kent State killings, both of which had occurred a few days earlier.9 Mr. 
Spence was arrested and convicted for improperly using the United 
States flag, a conviction affirmed by the Washington Supreme Court. 10 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that Mr. Spence's 
"activity, combined with the factual context and environment in which 
it was undertaken, lead to the conclusion that he engaged in a form of 
protected expression." 11 Mr. Spence used "a privately owned flag" 
which was "displayed ... on private property" with no intent "to incite 
violence or even stimulate a public demonstration."12 Under these 
8. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406 (1974). 
9. Id. at 405-06, 408. 
10. Id. at 408. 
1 I. Id. at 409- 10. 
12. Id. at 408-09. 
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circumstances, the Court said it "must examine with particular care the 
interests advanced by [the state] to support its prosecution."13 
The state did not advance an interest which could sustain Mr. Spence's 
conviction. He did not breach the peace. 14 He did not impose his 
ideas on passersby; those "who might have been offended could easily 
have avoided the display."15 He could not "be punished for failing to 
show proper respect for our national emblem." 16 
The state was left with arguing that it had "an interest in preserving 
the national flag as an unalloyed symbol of our country."17 The Court, 
assuming that this was a valid interest, still reversed the conviction 
because Mr. Spence displayed his flag "as a flag of his country in a way 
closely analogous to the manner in which flags have always been used 
to convey ideas." 18 Mr. Spence's ideas were conveyed in a manner 
which "was direct, likely to be understood, and within the contours of 
the First Amendment."19 
Although there are clear parallels between Mr. Spence's and Ms. 
Gilleo's protests, the Supreme Court did not rely on Spence to support 
its decision in Gilleo, perhaps because the state in Spence did not 
advance an aesthetic interest in controlling the individual's conduct.20 
Instead, Gilleo relied on three decisions which had reviewed "the 
constitutionality of municipal ordinances prohibiting the display of 
certain outdoor signs";21 each decision required at least a passing 
discussion of aesthetic values as a legitimate municipal regulatory 
interest. 
The first decision was Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of 
Willingboro which presented "the question whether the First Amendment 
permits a municipality to prohibit the posting of 'For Sale' or 'Sold' 
signs" in an effort to reduce white-flight.22 The Court, although 
characterizing the ordinance as "enacted to achieve an important 
governmental objective," found that it violated the First Amendment.23 
13. Id. at 411. 






20. The Gil/eo Court did cite Spence in support of the principle which affords a 
special respect for individual liberty in speaking at one's home, a place where the 
municipality's need to regulate is much less pressing than in public forums. See Gilleo, 
114 S. Ct. at 2047. 
21. Id. at 2042. 
22. 431 U.S. 85, 86 (1977). 
23. Id. at 95. 
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The Linmark Court began by reviewing decisions invalidating 
advertising restrictions on abortion services and prescription drug prices, 
noting that "the societal interest in 'the free flow of commercial 
information' . . . is in no way lessened by the fact that the subject of the 
commercial information here is realty rather than abortions or drugs."24 
The municipality's argument that the ordinance only restricted one 
method of communication was unavailing. The Court first responded 
that "serious questions exist as to whether the ordinance 'leave[s] open 
ample alternative channels for communication."'25 The alternatives 
were more costly, involved less homeowner autonomy, were less likely 
to reach a wide audience, and "may be less effective media for 
communicating the message that is conveyed by a 'For Sale' sign in 
front of the house to be sold."26 
Second, the Court responded that the municipality was "not genuinely 
concerned with the place of the speech--front lawns----or the manner of 
the speech--signs."27 The municipality did not seek "to promote 
aesthetic values or any other value 'unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression. "'28 The municipality did not seek "to restrict a mode of 
communication that 'intrudes on the privacy of the home, ... [or] makes 
it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure' . 
• • • "
29 The municipality did not seek to control the place or manner 
of speech which produced "a detrimental 'secondary effect' on 
society. "30 
What the municipality had sought to do was proscribe "particular 
types of signs based on their content because it fears their 'primary' 
effect----that they will cause those receiving the information to act upon 
it."31 The municipality sought to proscribe information "of vital 
interest to ... residents, since it may bear on one of the most important 
decisions they have a right to make: where to live and raise their 
families."32 The municipality could not, under the First Amendment, 
24. Id. at 92 ( citation omitted). 




29. Id. at 94. 
30. Id. 
3 I. Id. 
32. Id. at 96. 
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"restrict the free flow of these data because it fears that otherwise 
homeowners will make decisions inimical to what the [municipality] 
views as the homeowners' self-interest and the corporate interests of the 
[municipality]: they will choose to leave town."33 
The second sign decision relied on in Gilleo was Metromedia, Inc. v. 
City of San Diego, a decision which Justice Rehnquist likened to 
"judicial clangor," a "virtual Tower of Babel, from which no definitive 
principles can be clearly drawn."34 The municipality, acting to reduce 
traffic hazards and improve aesthetics, banned fixed-structure, off-site 
signs containing either commercial or non-commercial communication; 
it permitted on-site commercial advertising.35 Companies engaged in 
the outdoor advertising business claimed, among other claims, that the 
ordinance was invalid on its face under the First Amendment. 
The Court's plurality opinion began by noting that "[e]ach method of 
communicating ideas is 'a law unto itself' and that law must reflect the 
'differing natures, values, abuses, and dangers' of each method"; 
Metromedia dealt "with the law of billboards."36 The plurality de-
scribed billboards as "a well-established medium of communication, used 
to convey a broad range of different kinds of messages" on large, 
permanent structures designed to stand out from their surroundings.37 
Such structures create "a unique set of problems for land-use planning 
and development."38 Government can regulate the non-communicative 
aspects of billboards but when that regulation "impinges to some degree 
on the communicative aspects, ... " the courts must "reconcile the 
government's regulatory interests with the individual's right to expres-
sion."39 
That reconciliation was made more difficult by the banning of both 
off-site commercial and off- or on-site non-commercial communication. 
As to the former, the plurality applied this four part test: 
(I) The First Amendment protects commercial speech only if that speech 
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise 
protected commercial speech is valid only if it (2) seeks to implement a 
substantial governmental interest, (3) directly advances that interestb and (4) 
reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective.4 
33. Id. 
34. 453 U.S. 490, 569-70 (1981). 
35. Id. at 493-96. 
36. Id. at 501 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949)). 
37. Id. at 501-02. 
38. Id. at 502. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 507. 
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The Metromedia plurality quickly disposed of the first, second, and 
fourth criteria. In particular, the plurality said it was "far too late to 
contend" that traffic safety and aesthetics are other than substantial 
governmental interests.41 The plurality then found that the third 
criterion was satisfied, expressing a reluctance "to disagree with the 
accumulated, common-sense judgments of local lawmakers . . . that 
billboards are real and substantial hazards to traffic safety."42 Similar-
ly, the plurality said it was "not speculative to recognize that billboards 
by their very nature, wherever located and however constructed, can be 
perceived as an 'esthetic harm"'; however, these "esthetic judgments are 
necessarily subjective, defying objective evaluation, and for that reason 
must be carefully scrutinized to determine if they are only a public 
rationalization of an impermissible purpose."43 The plurality found that 
"insofar as [the ordinance] regulates commercial speech ... " it passed 
constitutional muster.44 
Not so, however, in its prohibition of on-site billboards used for non-
commercial communication. Although the municipality could distinguish 
between on- and off-site commercial communication, it did "not have the 
same range of choice in the area of non-commercial speech to evaluate 
the strength of, or distinguish between, various communicative inter-
ests."45 Simply put, the municipality could not "choose the appropriate 
subjects for public discourse."46 Because it had attempted to do so, it 
reached "too far into the realm of protected speech . . . " and the 
ordinance was, according to the plurality, "unconstitutional on its 
face."47 
Now arose the clangor of which Justice Rehnquist complained. 
Justices Brennan and Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, concluded 
that the municipality "failed to provide adequate justification for its 
substantial restriction on protected activity."48 Unlike the plurality, 
41. Id. at 507-08. 
42. Id. at 509. 
43. Id. at 510. The Court noted that "there is no claim in this case that San Diego 
has as an ulterior motive the suppression of speech, and the judgment involved here is 
not so unusual as to raise suspicions in itself." Id. 
44. Id. at 512. 
45. Id. at 514. 
46. Id. at 515. 
47. Id. at 521. 
48. Id. at 528. 
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which hesitated to question the municipality's accumulated judgments, 
these justices were not "so quick to accept legal conclusions in other 
cases as an adequate substitute for evidence in this case that banning 
billboards directly furthers traffic safety."49 Nor were these Justices so 
quick to accept the municipality's judgment on aesthetics, a judgment 
which "may not be exercised in contravention of the First Amend-
ment"50: 
Of course, it is not for a court to impose its own notion of beauty on San 
Diego. But before deferring to a city's judgment, a court must be convinced 
that the city is seriously and comprehensively addressing aesthetic concerns 
with respect to its environment. Here, San Diego has failed to demonstrate a 
comprehensive coordinated effort in its commercial and industrial areas to 
address other obvious contributors to an unattractive environment." 
That showing was indispensible "where, as here, there is an infringement 
of important constitutional consequence."52 
Justice Stevens, dissenting in part, was persuaded that "a wholly 
impartial total ban on billboards would be permissible."53 He thus 
found it "difficult to understand why the exceptions in San Diego's 
ordinance present any additional threat to the interests protected by the 
First Amendment."54 Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, found that the 
city has the authority to "protect its citizens' legitimate interests in traffic 
safety and the environment by eliminating distracting and ugly structures 
from its buildings and roadways, to define which billboards actually pose 
that danger, and to decide whether, in certain instances, the public's need 
for information outweighs the dangers perceived."55 Justice Rehnquist, 
dissenting, agreed "substantially" with the Chief Justice and Justice 
Stevens, regretting that "none of the views expressed in the other 
opinions . . . come close enough to mine to warrant the necessary 
compromise to obtain a Court opinion."56 
Three years later, the Court acted to mute the Metromedia clangor in 
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,57 the third sign 
decision relied on in Gilleo. A municipal ordinance prohibited sign-
posting on public property. Again, the question was whether this 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 530. 
51. Id. at 531. 
52. Id. at 533. 
53. Id. at 553. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 557. 
56. Id. at 569-70. 
57. 466 U.S. 789 (1984). 
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abridged the First Amendment. The Court, in an opinion authored by 
Justice Stevens, decided that it did not. 
The Court found that the ordinance, as written and as applied, was "a 
viewpoint-neutral regulation .... "58 Since the parties agreed that the 
municipality could constitutionally "attempt to improve its appearance, 
... " an interest which "is basically unrelated to the suppression of 
ideas", the Court asked "whether that interest is sufficiently substantial 
to justify the effect of the ordinance on [the citizens'] expression, and 
whether that effect is no greater than necessary to accomplish the City's 
purpose."59 
The Vincent Court, reconciling the plurality and dissenting opinions 
in Metromedia, "reaffirmed" what it . characterized as Metromedia s 
majority conclusion: "The problem addressed by this ordinance-the 
visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumula-
tion of signs posted on public property--constitutes a significant 
substantive evil within the City's power to prohibit."60 The Vincent 
Court also concluded that the prohibition was properly tailored to 
address this evil.61 
Again using Metromedia as if it sang in harmony rather than rang in 
clangor, the Vincent Court said that "[ a ]s is true of billboards, the 
esthetic interests that are implicated by temporary signs are presumptive-
ly at work in all parts of the city," interests that "are both psychological 
and economic."62 Those interests were "sufficiently substantial to 
justify this content-neutral, impartially administered prohibition against 
the posting of ... temporary signs on public property"; that "application 
of the ordinance does not create an unacceptable threat to the 'profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should 
Id. 
58. Id. at 804. 
59. Id. at 805. 
60. Id. at 807. 
61. See id. at 810. 
With respect to [the] signs posted ... it is the tangible medium of expressing 
the message that has the adverse impact on the appearance of the landscape. 
. . . Here, the substantive evil-visual blight-is not merely a possible 
byproduct of the activity, but is created by the medium of expression itself. 
. . . [T]he application of the ordinance in this case responds precisely to the 
substantive problem which legitimately concerns the City. The ordinance 
curtails no more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose. 
62. Id. at 817. 
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be uninhibited, robust and wide-open. "'63 In what would be a signifi-
cant aside for Ms. Gilleo, the Court suggested that 
the validity of the esthetic interest in the elimination of signs on public property 
is not compromised by failing to extend the ban to private property. The 
private citizen's interest in controlling the use of his own property justifies the 
disparate treatment. Moreover, by not extending the ban to all locations, a 
significant opportunity to communicate by means of temporary signs is 
preserved, and private property owners' esthetic concerns will keep the posting 
of signs on their property within reasonable bounds. 64 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, dissented 
in Vincent, finding the Court's analysis "seriously inadequate" because 
it "failed to develop a reliable means of gauging the nature or the depth 
of the City's commitment to pursuing the goal of eradicating 'visual 
clutter. "'65 The dissent characterized the Court's review of the 
ordinance as "cursory" and overly deferential to the municipality's 
aesthetic judgment.66 The dissent argued that "it is only when aesthetic 
regulation is addressed in a comprehensive and focused manner that we 
can ensure that the goals pursued are substantial and that the manner in 
which they are pursued is no more restrictive of speech than is 
necessary."67 
These three sign decisions---Linmark, Metromedia, and Vin-
cent---provided the foundation for the Court's analysis in Gilleo. The 
three decisions established that although signs were a form of protected 
expression, "they pose distinctive problems that are subject to 
municipalities' police powers. "68 Using that analysis, the municipality 
in Gilleo argued that its ordinance prohibiting the hanging of a small 
protest sign from the second floor window of Ms. Gilleo's private house 
was based on the "content-neutral justification" of promoting "aesthetic 
values unrelated to the content of the prohibited speech."69 
The Gilleo Court began by assuming that the ordinance was "free of 
impermissible content or viewpoint discrimination"; it also noted the 
63. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964)). 
64. Id. at 811. The Gilleo Court also stated that, 
[i]t bears mentioning that individual residents themselves have strong 
incentives to keep their own property values up and to prevent "visual clutter" 
in their own yards and neighborhoods-incentives markedly different from 
those of persons who erect signs on others' land, in others' neighborhoods, or 
on public property. Residents' self-interest diminishes the danger of the 
"unlimited" proliferation of residential signs that concerns the City of Ladue. 
114 S. Ct. at 2047. 
65. 466 U.S. at 827. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 830-31. 
68. Gilleo, I I 4 S. Ct. at 204 I. 
69. Id. at 2042. 
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municipality's "concededly valid" interest "in minimizing the visual 
clutter associated with signs."70 That interest, however, was "no more 
compelling than the interests at stake in Linmark:' and the "impact on 
free communication" was "manifestly greater."71 Linmark's ordinance 
"applied only to a form of commercial speech"; the City of Ladue's 
ordinance applied to "even such absolutely pivotal speech as a sign 
protesting an imminent governmental decision to go to war."72 
The Gilleo Court also distinguished Vincent. The means of communi-
cation at issue in Vincent-"signs placed on public property"-were not 
unique nor did the ordinance bar the taxpayers from using other means 
of effective communication.73 However, Ladue's ordinance "almost 
completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both 
unique and important."74 Residential signs like Ms. Gilleo's "have long 
been an important and distinct medium of expression" which can "both 
reflect and animate change in the life of a community."75 Ladue's 
ordinance had "closed off' an important medium of speech for which 
there was no adequate substitute.7 And, as the Court added, "a person 
who puts up a sign at her residence often intends to reach neighbors, an 
audience that could not be reached nearly as well by other means."77 
When added to the previous sign cases, Gilleo demonstrates that a 
municipality, acting to promote an aesthetic interest by an ordinance 
which is content-neutral toward the regulated expression, may still 
transgress the First Amendment by unduly foreclosing an effective 
opportunity to transmit that expression, especially when a private citizen 
uses private property to make a non-commercial statement. This Article, 
using the writings and buildings of Robert Venturi, will argue that the 
privately owned single-family house is itself a statement, an expression 
Id. 
70. Id. at 2044-45. 





76. See id. at 2046. 
Displaying a sign from one's own residence often carries a message quite 
distinct from placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text 
and picture by other means. Precisely because of their location, such signs 
provide information about the identity of the "speaker" .... [T]he identity of 
the speaker is an important component of many attempts to persuade. 
77. Id. 
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in its external design of the views and values of the inhabitants, an 
expression which a municipality may aesthetically regulate only if it 
establishes a sufficently substantial need to do so under narrow, clearly 
defined standards. 
The City of Ladue again provides an example of what is at stake. In 
State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, a Ladue ordinance established an 
architectural review board authorized to approve building plans and 
specifications. 78 The ordinance sought to ensure that buildings "con-
form to certain minimum architectural standards of appearance and 
conformity with surrounding structures, and that unsightly, grotesque and 
unsuitable structures ... be avoided, and that appropriate standards of 
beauty and conformity be fostered and encouraged."79 
The Stoyanoffs applied for a permit to build a single-family house 
which, although "unusual in design," complied with all building codes 
and regulations.80 The architectural review board refused to issue the 
permit because, as the building commissioner stated, the house was "a 
monstrosity of grotesque design, which would seriously impair the value 
of property in the neighborhood."81 The Stoyanoffs sued to compel 
issuance of the permit. The trial court granted their motion for summary 
judgment, a grant which was reversed on appeal. 
The Missouri Supreme Court analyzed the ordinance in terms of its 
effect on general welfare. Although the Stoyanoffs' proposed house did 
"not descend to the 'patently offensive character of vehicle graveyards,"' 
it was "a highly modernistic residence" proposed for an area "where 
traditional Colonial, French Provincial, and English Tudor styles of 
architecture are erected."82 The court said it was "certainly in keeping 
with the ultimate ideal of general welfare" to "preserve and protect 
existing areas in which structures of a general conformity of architecture 
have been erected."83 The court, characterizing the area under consid-
eration as "clearly ... a fashionable one," quoted the following from a 
Louisiana decision: "If by the term 'aesthetic consideration' is meant a 
regard merely for outward appearances, for good taste in the matter of 
beauty of the neighborhood itself, we do not observe any substantial 
78. 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970). 
79. Id. at 306-07 (quoting Ordinance 131, which is at issue). 
80. Id. at 306. Photographs of the proposed design showed "the residence to be 
of a pyramid shape, with a flat top, and with triangular shaped windows or doors at one 
or more comers." Id. at 308. 
8 I. Id. at 307. 
82. Id. at 310. 
83. Id. 
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reason for saying that such a consideration is not a matter of general 
welfare."84 
The municipality entrusted a three-member board with the task of 
determining whether the exterior design of a proposed house was in 
good taste. The board's chair initially determined if the proposed house 
conformed "to proper architectural standards in appearance and design," 
if it conformed to "the style and design of surrounding structures," and 
if it was "conducive to the proper architectural development of the 
city."85 If the house so conformed, the board's chair approved the 
application; if not, he referred it to the full board which would 
"disapprove the application if it determines the proposed structure will 
constitute an unsightly, grotesque, or unsuitable structure in appearance, 
detrimental to the welfare of surrounding property or residents."86 
The Stoyanoffs argued that these standards were inadequate, clothing 
the board with unreviewable discretion. The court disagreed, finding the 
general standards "sufficient" and finding it proper to evaluate the 
exterior design of a proposed house "with reference to the character of 
the surrounding neighborhood and to the determination of any adverse 
effect on the general welfare and preservation of property values of the 
community."87 
We do not know why the Stoyanoffs wanted to build their pyramid-
shaped house in a Queen Anne neighborhood other than the obvious: 
they wanted to live in that house in that place. Perhaps they were early 
New Age, finding a source of psychic power in pyramids; perhaps they 
were avant-garde, wanting to express the virtues of a new type of 
residential architecture; perhaps they were iconoclasts, attacking the staid 
architectural beliefs of their neighbors; perhaps they just liked what the 
design said. We just don't know. 
What we do know is that the municipality prevented them from 
expressing themselves through the exterior design of their house because 
the municipality considered their expression grotesque and unsuitable 
and a threat to what it regarded as its special ambience. Considerations 
less offensive to the First Amendment underlay the same municipality's 
84. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440,444 (La. 
1923)). 
85. Id. at 310-11. 
86. Id. at 31 I. 
87. Id. at 312. 
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attempt to squelch Ms. Gilleo 's expression, an attempt which failed a 
First Amendment review. The Stoyanoffs' expression should also have 
received a First Amendment review under which the municipality would 
not have been permitted to squelch their expression. 
II. 
In both Stoyanoff and Gilleo, the municipality used a legal aesthetics 
standard to justify its actions, a standard which is difficult to define and 
easy to abuse and, frankly, a pain for courts to analyze and evaluate 
under traditional legal principles. Yet, as John Costonis, the leading 
analyst of legal aesthetics, has forcefully argued, "we are condemned to 
come to terms with aesthetics, whether we like it or not."88 As he 
noted, legal aesthetics "is a product of the tension between two sets of 
values with different sources, goals, and legal champions."89 It is not 
a "blissful marriage."9° Compounding the tension is architecture's 
protean nature. Things change: new expressions gain currency, old 
symbols are reevaluated, viewer perception is awakened, what was 
thought absolute is seen as ambiguous. Stasis is not healthy. 
Until the later 1960's and early 1970's, American architectural thought 
was dominated by a modernist school, rigidly geometric, deliberately 
unsymbolic.91 That domination was challenged and ultimately over-
thrown, a rebellion instigated and continued by the words and work of 
Robert Venturi. Beginning with his gentle manifesto, Complexity and 
Contradiction in Architecture,92 Venturi "looked with fresh eyes at the 
88. JOHN J. COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS: LAW, AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMEN-
TAL CHANGE 15 (I 989). He added that lawmakers "must attend to these considerations 
unless they are prepared to shut down land use regulation in its entirety." Id. 
89. Id. at 36. 
90. Id. He said "[a] blissful marriage of law and aesthetics assumes that end-state 
values, newly received into the law by legislators and administrators, will respect 
constitutionally based process values, whose ultimate guardians, of course, are the 
judges." Id. 
Another analyst has noted that the law itself "is a builder of worlds. Through 
constitution-framing, legislation, and adjudication, law structures individuals into patterns 
of rights and responsibilities. Decisionmakers conceive an image of legal reality that 
becomes concrete through state enforcement." Laura S. Fitzgerald, Toward a Modern 
Art of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 2051 (1987). 
91. See Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural 
Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 699, 791-92 ( 1993). 
92. ROBERT VENTURI, COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE (2d 
ed. I 977) [hereinafter COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION]; see also CHARLES JENCKS, 
MODERN MOVEMENTS IN ARCHITECTURE 221-22 (1973). 
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Venturi's gentle manifesto has had an extraordinary impact in architectural 
circles .... [H]is arguments for an "inclusive architecture" which can use any 
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architectural landscape of America" and "challenged prevailing 
thinking. "93 He changed "the course of architecture in this century, 
allowing architects and consumers the freedom to accept inconsistencies 
in form and pattern, to enjoy popular taste."94 He rediscovered and 
publicized the content "of honest architectural meaning: forms that 
mean something as a slope usually means a roof, ... "95 
Venturi, who (and whose work) is described as "urbane, cultured, 
deeply responsive to history and art and unusually understanding of 
existing values," has offered solutions, in his writing and his building, 
which reflect "an extremely sophisticated, subtle, sympathetic, and 
sometimes wry, sensibility."96 He provided "intellectual legitimacy and 
depth" for what was an incipient dissatisfaction with architectural rigidity 
and conformity; he intellectually and physically demonstrated how to 
satisfy a need for a rich and varied architecture which celebrates irony 
and metaphor and even vulgarity.97 The Stoyanoffs might well have 
Id. 
elements whatever ... have effectively challenged the prevailing exclusivist 
arguments for purity and restriction. . . . In a sense his polemic is directed 
against the idea of an historicist sensibility which wants to restrict the 
available metaphors to those which are only current or technologically up to 
date. The idea is that in the age of travel and tourism, the age of the 
"museum without walls", this restriction is no longer relevant and furthermore 
that in any large city with its plurality of sub-cultures, such limitation is highly 
paternalistic. 
93. THE PRITZKER ARCHITECTURE PRIZE: 1991: PRESENTED TO ROBERT VENTURI 
(Unpaged). The Pritzker Award is "architecture's rough equivalent of the Nobel Prize." 
Paul Goldberger, Robert Venturi, Gentle Subverter of Modernism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 
1991, at H36. 
94. THE PRITZKER ARCHITECTURE PRIZE, supra note 93. 
95. Nathan Silver, Learning From Las Vegas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1973, § 7 at 
6, 7 (book review). 
96. Ada L. Huxtable, The Venturi 'Anti-Style' of Architecture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
30, 1977, at 027. 
97. Moshe Safdie, Private Jokes in Public Places, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 
I 98 I, at 66; see also Christopher Mead, Introduction: The Meaning of "Both-And" in 
Venturi 's Architecture, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF ROBERT VENTURI 3 (Christopher Mead 
ed., 1989). 
This shift from a search for the singular and abstractly homogeneous solution 
to the study of multiple and actually heterogeneous solutions has both 
informed the ongoing debate over what is significant in contemporary 
architecture and made Venturi a symbol of the current confusion. . . . Such 
an architect, and such an architecture, eludes the easy categorizations of 
stylistic judgment and leaves one with the awkward certainty that his work 
follows a coherent logic even if one cannot reduce that logic to a single 
solution. 
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found a champion in Venturi. 
Venturi began by openly opposing established architectural opinion, 
decrying its unwillingness to confront the confusions and complications 
of current conditions.98 He urged the profession to reflect on its 
history, "guided not by habit but by a conscious sense of the past-by 
precedent, thoughtfully considered."99 What he found satisfying in the 
past was its lack of forced simplification;100 this led him to conclude 
that "[a] valid order accommodates the circumstantial contradictions of 
a complex reality. It accommodates as well as imposes. It thereby 
admits ... improvisation within the whole. It tolerates qualifications 
and compromise."101 
Accomodation and toleration instead of suppression and absolutism; 
that was the radical change Venturi proposed. Architecture must accept 
"elements that are both good and awkward, big and little, closed and 
open, continuous and articulated, round and square, structural and 
Id. 
98. See Arthur Drexler, Foreword to ROBERT VENTURI, COMPLEXITY AND 
CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE 8 (2d ed. 1977). 
Id. 
Like his buildings, Venturi's book opposes what many would consider 
Establishment, or at least established, opinions. He speaks with uncommon 
candor, addressing himself to actual conditions: the ambiguous and sometimes 
unattractive "facts" in which architects find themselves enmeshed at each 
moment, and whose confusing nature Venturi would seek to make the basis of 
architectural design. 
99. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 13. 
I 00. See COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 17 ("Forced 
simplicity results in oversimplification. . . . Where simplicity cannot work, simpleness 
results. Blatant simplification means bland architecture. Less is a bore."). 
101. Id. at 41; see also STANISLAUS VON Moos, VENTURI, RAUCH & SCOTT 
BROWN: BUILDINGS AND DESIGNS 32 ( 1987). 
Id. 
306 
[Venturis'] intention seems to be to undermine the validity of universal rules 
in architecture. . . . [A]rchitectural theory had been essentially normative. 
The main concern was the establishment and the polemical spread of a formal 
language and of systematic rules that were supposed to guarantee "correct" 
building. The Venturis, however, view stylistic "purity" with suspicion. With 
them it does not seem at all to be a matter of substituting new forms of 
architectural language for old ones but rather of introducing the aesthetic 
principle of complexity in order to avoid the uncritical application of allegedly 
universal forms and rules. 
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spatial."102 And, in accepting this, architecture must accept the 
ambiguity and tension which it breeds. 
Venturi found strength in this ambiguity and tension, preferring 
"richness of meaning rather than clarity of meaning," believing that "[a] 
valid architecture evokes many levels of meaning and combinations of 
focus: its space and its elements become readable and workable in 
several ways at once."103 He urged architects to acknowledge the 
"complexity and contradiction in architecture," to accept an architecture 
"based on the richness and ambiguity of modern experience," to deal 
with that experience whose "anomalies and uncertainties give validity to 
architecture." 1 04 
Id. 
102. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 23. 
If the source of the both-and phenomenon is contradiction, its basis is 
hierarchy, which yields several levels of meanings among elements with 
varying values. It can include elements that are both good and awkward, big 
and little, closed and open, continuous and articulated, round and square, 
structural and spatial. An architecture which includes varying levels of 
meaning breeds ambiguity and tension. 
Designing from the outside in, as well as from the inside out, creates necessary 
tensions, which help make architecture. Since the inside is different from the 
outside, the wall----the point of change----becomes an architectural event. 
Architecture occurs at the meeting of interior and exterior forces of use and 
space. . . . Architecture as the wall between the inside and the outside 
becomes the spatial record of this resolution and its drama. 
Id. at 86. 
Id. 
103. Id. at 16. 
Architects can no longer afford to be intimidated by the puritanically moral 
language of orthodox Modem architecture. I like elements which are hybrid 
rather than "pure," compromising rather than "clean," distorted rather than 
"straightforward," ambiguous rather than "articulated," perverse as well as 
impersonal, boring as well as "interesting," conventional rather than "de-
signed," accommodating rather than excluding, redundant rather than simple, 
vestigial as well as innovating, inconsistent and equivocal rather than direct 
and clear. I am for messy vitality over obvious unity. I include the non 
sequitur and proclaim the duality. 
I 04. Id. at 16, 41; see also Robert Venturi, Diversity, Relevance, and Representation 
in Historicism, or Plus ,a Change ... plus a Plea for Pattern All Over Architecture 
with a Postscript on My Mother's House, in ROBERT VENTURI & DENISE SCOTT BROWN, 
A VIEW FROM THE CAMPIDOGLIO: SELECTED ESSAYS 1953-1984 I 08 (Peter Amell et al. 
eds., 1984) [hereinafter, VIEW FROM THE CAMPIDOGLIO] (where Venturi describes his 
call "for an architecture that promotes richness and ambiguity over unity and clarity, 
contradiction and redundancy over harmony and simplicity"). 
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Venturi 's architecture of complexity and contradiction is not 
diffracted; it seeks unity, "the difficult unity through inclusion rather 
than the easy unity through exclusion."105 The unity of inclusion 
recognizes rather than masks the ambiguities and tensions, the anomalies 
and uncertainties of modern experience: 
The obligation toward the whole in an architecture of complexity and 
contradiction does not preclude the building which is unresolved. Poets and 
playwrights acknowledge dilemmas without solutions. The validity of the 
questions and vividness of meaning are what make their works art more than 
philosophy. . . . A building can also be more or less incomplete in the 
expression of it program and its form. 106 
Venturi 's reference to literature, as well as his use of the term 
expression, was not inadvertent. His buildings are as much an expres-
sion of his views as were his writings. In either medium, he is always 
communicating to an audience. 107 He understands that building is "a 
form of public discourse," that it serves "as a way of informing and 
connecting that which is new with that which already exists."108 This 
was how architecture functioned in the past; it was this function which 
Venturi brought forward to counter the absolutism and monasticism of 
modern architecture. He argued for the development of an "architectural 
105. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 88. 
I 06. Id. at I 02. 
107. See Vincent Scully, Robert Venturi's Gentle Architecture, in THE ARC!IlTEC-
TURE OF ROBERT VENTURI, supra note 97, at 8, 17. 
Venturi will never make a building without a comment, without something in 
it that can only be of now. It is not a sense of the zeitgeist which directs 
him-----not a feeling of being limited by the present, but rather of being 
liberated by it to comment as he desires. 
Id. at 17. 
[In the Guild House] Venturi was trying to deal with the real, and with the 
compassion that only irony can handle. He is wholly an artist, and his primary 
concern is to increase the aesthetic intensity of everyone's reaction to his 
building. And he did: where there might have been apathy or pro Jonna 
approbation, there was at least concern. 
Id. at 24. 
108. Neil Levine, Robert Venturi and "The Return of Historicism, " in THE 
ARCHITECTURE OF ROBERT VENTURI, supra note 97, at 45, 65. Earlier, the author said 
Venturi used "the signifying elements of representation that allow architecture to 
function as part of a larger social and urban form of discourse." Id. at 56; see also 
Francis Carney, The summa popologica of Robert ('call me Vegas') Venturi, RIBA J., 
May I 973, at 242. 
Id. 
308 
Venturi is ... wholly in favour of symbolic content in building. What makes 
the building of the orthodox modems "irresponsible", he says, is the fact that 
architects are unwilling or unable to recognise the content they put into their 
buildings .... [M]ost modern buildings are merely so many media for an 
outworn upper middle class message, and the message and the medium are the 
same thing. 
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rhetoric" which would "genuinely represent his client's aspirations and 
way of life,"109 which would produce buildings "rich in calculated 
symbolism and iconography and [which] were meant to be read that 
way_,,110 
It is that ability to be read which gives buildings, including the single-
family house, an expressive content. Venturi unearthed and revitalized 
an architecture, including a residential architecture, which gave the 
viewer "deliberate symbols, not abstract forms---symbols of building 
types, of life styles, of American society, .... " 111 Venturi respects 
America's single-family house tradition and its symbols; he uses that 
tradition and those symbols to express something new. 112 Venturi sees 
the single-family house as an opportunity for the novice architect to 
"deal with a real user-client, . . . and therefore to deal with the 
irrationalities of emotional needs and values"; he sees it as an opportuni-
ty for the experienced architect "to be able to control the whole in a way 
that distills and clarifies and informs the bigger work at hand."113 
What Venturi delivers is a house expressing the client's needs and values 
in a way which is clear to the reader. This, as the next section will 
discuss, is architecture as expression comparable to other forms of 
expression recognized in First Amendment jurisprudence. 
109. Roger Jellinek, In Praise(!) of las Vegas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1972, at L23. 
110. Ada L. Huxtable, In Love With Times Square, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 18, 
1973, at 29, 46. 
111. Paul Goldberger, Less is More-Mies van der Rohe; Less is a Bore-Robert 
Venturi, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 17, 1971, at 34, 102. 
112. See Paul Goldberger, Architecture: Venturi and Rauch, ARCHITECTURAL DIG., 
Jan.-Feb. 1978, at I 03. 
Id. 
Venturi and Rauch is a finn of architects deeply concerned with architectural 
symbolism and with the use of cultural symbols as makers of architectural 
fonn. There is no modem purism here. Instead, there is respect for the 
traditional American shingled house, and an attempt to use that tradition as the 
beginning point for something new. 
113. Robert Venturi & Denise S. Brown, Some Houses of Ill-Repute, in VIEW FROM 
THE CAMPIDOGLIO, supra note I 04, at 38; see also Paul Goldberger, The Masterpieces 
They Call Home, N.Y. TIMES MAG., March 12, 1995, at 41, 60 ("Whoever the client and 
whatever the relationship, the house is the arena in which an architect can express his 
ideas most easily. Architects who routinely design skyscrapers and museums crave the 




Architecture, particularly as seen in the exterior of the single-family 
house, is an expressive art, expressive of individual and cultural values, 
status, and yeamings. 114 Recognizing and celebrating this expressive 
content is a hallmark of Robert Venturi's architectural theory and 
production. He is an artist who has opened our eyes, who has described 
and produced an expressive architecture. 115 He successfully undertook 
a search for meaning and symbolism, a way to reestablish architecture's ties 
with human experience, a way to find and express a value system, a concern for 
architecture in the context of society. . . . [A]rchitecture is much more than 
real estate, shelter, or good intentions; it is the recognition of that extraordinary 
mixture of the pragmatic and the spiritual that is the tangible vehicle of man's 
aspirations and beliefs, the lasting indicator of his civilized achievements. n, 
Architects, like painters or poets or even law review writers, must 
have something to say; otherwise, why undertake the project?117 Every 
114. See Bruce A. Rubin, Architecture, Aesthetic Zoning, and the First Amendment, 
28 STAN. L. REV. 179, 182 (1975); Aoki, supra note 91, at 773, 779, 784-85, 794. For 
the views of non-law review writers, see the special Houses As Art issue ofN.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Mar. 12, 1995. See also WITOLD RYBCZYNSKI, LOOKING AROUND: A JOURNEY 
THROUGH ARCHITECTURE 187-88 (1992) [hereinafter LOOKING AROUND] 
("[A]rchitecture, like painting, is an art, and hence can be appreciated on its own merits. 
In the sense that 'art' refers to any skill applied to a creative activity, architecture 
certainly qualifies."). 
115. See Vincent Skully, Introduction to ROBERT VENTURJ, COMPLEXITY AND 
CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE 11 (2d ed. 1977). 
116. Ada L. Huxtable, The Troubled State of Modern Architecture, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS, May 1980, at 22, 29; see also Robert Hughes, Doing Their Own Thing, TIME, 
Jan. 8, 1979, at 52. 
Id. 
or architecture is the social art: one looks at a painting or sculpture, but 
people live and work in buildings. It is the most expensive art of all and 
therefore the slowest to change; for once clients are used to a particular look, 
a standard method of construction and an conventional system of status-
conferring clues, it is hard to wean any but the most adventurous away from 
them. Architecture is also the most visible of all arts. Buildings shape the 
environment; painting and sculpture only adorn it. 
117. See Charles Jencks, Venturi et al. are Almost all Right, 4 7 ARCHITECTURAL 
DESIGN no. 7-8 (1977) at 469 ("If architects have nothing important to say, if society has 
no credible ideology to communicate through its buildings, then building language is 
going to deteriorate even further."); see also Sigrid H. Fowler, Architecture and the Civic 
Body, I J. POPULAR CULTURE 426 (1973). 
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Buildings-as-the-communicating-body-of-a-culture is not a new idea. . .. 
Architecture is, after all, an art form as well as a convenience and as such 
involves communication between artist and perceiver. It is easy to see how 
words like "vocabulary" and "vernacular" might be current in architectural 
trade jargon .... 
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building, even the most standard of tract houses, says something; the 
house, in particular, says something about the inhabitants, something 
which can be read by them, by their neighbors, by passersby. 118 
Venturi has enriched the content of this expression and has made it 
explicit; he has revitalized the architect's vocabulary and recalled from 
exile "the traditional power of building to express ideas and values as 
well as spatial relationships." 119 Borrowing from literary theory and 
expression, he resurrected architecture's "symbolic properties," 
reminding us that architecture conveys meaning "because people 
experience buildings not only as volume and forms to be seen ... but 
also intellectually, in the mmd's eye."120 Architecture is part of our 
Id.; John F. Pile, Book Review, INTERIORS, July 1967, at 24 (reviewing ROBERT 
VENTURI, COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE (Museum of Modern 
Art, I 967)) ("Insofar as architecture is an art (as distinguished from a building 
technology) it is concerned with expressio~xpression of its physical reality in 
structure and function, and of its time and place through their effects on the attitudes of 
the architect."); LOOKING AROUND, supra note 114, at 266 ("The communication of 
meaning, more than beauty, distinguishes architecture frorn engineering."). 
118. See Fowler, supra note 117, at 429 ("Architects [according to Venturi and his 
co-authors] must contribute not just to the public's aesthetic awareness, but also to its 
needs. They must communicate with instead of lecturing our society, or at least speak 
to it but also listen."). See also Lance Wright, Robert Venturi and Anti-Architecture, 
ARCHITECTURAL REV., Apr. I 973, at 262, 264, describing architecture as, 
a social art; it is not, and never has been, the exclusive province of a race of 
people called "architects." Certainly architects have a special function within 
this province: to put new ideas into circulation; in some manner to "control" 
and make meaningful the places where people go; and above all to convert 
visual ideas into the architectural medium, giving them the degree of 
abstraction and of boldness needed to make them "read" in the wide setting 
of architectural space. 
119. Franz Schulze, Chaos as Architecture, ART IN AM., July-Aug. 1970, at 89, 93. 
As Venturi explained, architects 
have traditionally used symbolism in architecture to enrich its content and to 
include other dimensions, some almost literary, which make architecture a not 
purely spatial medium. Symbolism expands the scope of architecture to 
include meaning as well as expression, and to promote explicit communication, 
denotative as well as connotative. 
VIEW FROM THE CAMPIDOGLIO, supra note I 04, at I 09. 
120. W!TOLD RYBCZYNSK!, THE MOST BEAUTIFUL HOUSE IN THE WORLD 161 
(1989). The author then developed this point: 
Umberto Eco has described the different symbolic properties of architectural 
objects as fulfilling either a primary or a secondary sign-function. The first 
is denotative and related directly to the utilitarian function of the object; the 
second catagory is connotative and carries a more complex set of meanings. 
. . . [N]either catagory is fixed, and over time one or the other can change or 
even disappear. 
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language, a rich and expressive part. 
However, unlike a painter or a poet who can create solely for his or 
her own pleasure, without regard to a buying or even an observing 
public, the non-hermetic architect creates designs to be built, to be used, 
to fulfill a function, to transmit meaning for the inhabitants and to 
others. 121 Architecture reflects values; it "is always a mirror in which, 
if we look carefully, we can catch glimpses of our own aspirations and 
beliefs."122 This mirror is both large and small; we can see ourselves 
in the largest of public buildings or in the most modest of houses. 
Architecture's "most difficult task" is to create "places that can speak 
meaningfully to their users."123 This is what Venturi's architecture has 
done; it has opened the way to "the organization of a unique whole 
through conventional parts and the judicious introduction of new parts 
when the old won't do," creating "meaningful contexts" which create 
"new meanings."124 His architecture expresses much about who we 
are and who we want to be in a world filled with complexity and 
contradiction. 125 Venturi 's architecture is expression as surely as oral 
Id. at 162. 
121. See id. at 4 ("All buildings have a function [and] are undertaken not to gratify 
the designer but to fulfill a social purpose."); see a/so COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADIC-
TION, supra note 92, at 11 {"There is no way to separate form from meaning; one cannot 
exist without the other. There can only be different critical assessments of the major 
ways through which form transmits meaning to the viewer."). 
122. LOOKING AROUND, supra note 114, at xviii. The author believes that "[t]he 
importance of buildings ... was not what they said about the vision of individual 
architects, but how they reflected the values of the society of which they were a part." 
Id. He later developed this point: 
Classical architecture managed to convey meaning in a fashion that was not 
only rich enough to be used in a variety of public buildings but also widely 
understood and cherished. Its potency and its longevity were enhanced by its 
widespread application in the modest architecture of homes and places of 
work. 
Id. at 267. 
123. Martin Filler, Seeing the Forest for the Trees, PROGRESSIVE ARCHITECTURE 
56, 58 (Oct. 1977). See also Goldberger, supra note 113, at 56-57, quoting the architect 
Robert A.M. Stem: 
I think a really good architect has a sense of how spaces unfold visually, how 
you get people to move through space, how people really live," Stem says. 
"The house is one kind of building that is experienced day in and day out by 
the same people, not like a museum you go to just a handful of times. It is 
a series of extraordinarily complex specifics that an architect has to put 
together and end up with something general enough to be understood by a lot 
of people. 
124. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 43. 
125. Venturi, who believes that in finding what "we like ... we can learn much of 
what we really are," says he "frankly write[s] about what I like in architecture: 
complexity and contradiction." Id. at 13. He has emphasized "image-image over 
process or form in asserting that architecture depends in its perception and creation on 
past experience and emotional association and that these symbolic and representational 
312 
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or written speech is; "he thinks visually with forms as much as he thinks 
verbally with words."126 His buildings are meant to be seen, to be 
read with intelligence; form not only follows thought, form is thought. 
Venturi's career began with housing, both single-family and group. 
He is sensitive not only to housing's shelter qualities but also to its 
expressive content. He knows that "Americans' self-expression in and 
around their homes is an important clue to their attitudes, the more so 
because this form of self-expression is practiced by almost all social 
groups, by young and old, rich and poor, renters and owners, urbanites 
and suburbanites."127 He knows that our houses embody sentiments 
and values, expressing them to our neighbors and passersby. 
Although this conclusion seems inescapable--that the exterior design 
of a single-family house has an expressive content-it is a conclusion 
which must be accepted if the further argument is to be made: that the 
elements may often be contradictory to the form, structure and program with which they 
combine in the same building." ROBERT VENTURI, ET AL., LEARNING FROM LAS 
VEGAS: THE FORGOTTEN SYMBOLISM OF ARCHITECTURAL FORM 87 (Rev. ed. 1977). 
That emphasis is seen in this review of a Venturi building: 
Wu Hall is an inclusive essay in architectural convention. . . . What Wu Hall 
does do ... is---like Eliot's poems---force us to compare inconsistent, even 
irreconcilable, conventions that have been improbably drawn together within 
the same constructive system. . . . All architectural construction and form ... 
assumes a self-conscious sense of convention in this rhetorical world, with the 
improbable comparisons heightening our sense of both the past and present and 
proposing a world within which both co-exist in an uneasy but meaningful 
juxtaposition. 
Stephen Kieran, The Image in the Empty Frame: Wu Hall and the Art of Representa-
tion, THE ARCHITECTURE OF ROBERT VENTURI, supra note 97, at 87. 
Id. 
126. Mead, supra note 97, at 6. 
The act of seeing, of looking with intelligence, is emphasized because it seems 
that architects and historians alike have tended to substitute passing familiarity 
with Venturi' s architectural theory for perceptive comprehension of his 
buildings. The notoriety [ofVenturi's books] has obscured the simple fact that 
Venturi is, first of all, an architect ... that he thinks visually with forms as 
much as he thinks verbally with words. The interpretive bias for a philological 
understanding of Venturi must be balanced by a return to the expression of his 
ideas in architectural forms. 
127. Robert Venturi et al., The Home, in VENTURI, SCOTT BROWN & ASSOCIATES 
ON HOUSES AND HOUSING 59 (1992) [hereinafter The Home]; see also WITOLD 
RYBCZYNSKI, HOME: A SHORT HISTORY OF AN IDEA 75 (1986) ("To speak of 
domesticity is to describe a set of felt emotions, not a single attribute. Domesticity has 
to do with family, intimacy, and a devotion to the home, as well as with a sense of the 
house as embodying-not only harboring-these sentiments."). 
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expressive content is entitled to First Amendment protection. Finding 
the expression is always the starting point. 
That was the starting point in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim 
where operators of adult bookstores challenged an ordinance which 
prohibited all live entertainment including the non-obscene nude dancing 
which the bookstores offered their customers. 128 The operators argued 
that the prohibition violated First Amendment free expression rights. 
The Supreme Court agreed. 
The Court started by finding that the ordinance's prohibition barred: 
a wide range of expression that has long been held to be within the protections 
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Entertainment, as well as political 
and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by 
radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic 
works, fall with the First Amendment guarantee .... Furthermore, ... nude 
dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from official regula-
tion.129 
Although the municipality could zone to achieve "a satisfactory quality 
of life," its zoning power was "not infinite and unchallengeable; it 'must 
be exercised within constitutional limits. "'130 
Those limits make every exercise of zoning power "subject to judicial 
review" under a standard "determined by the nature of the right 
assertedly threatened or violated rather than by the power being 
exercised or the specific limitations imposed."131 Although zoning of 
property interests generally receives a rational relationship review, "when 
a zoning law infringes upon a protected liberty, it must be narrowly 
drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial government inter-
est."132 Because the ordinance at issue in Schad "significantly" limited 
"communicative activity," the Court scrutinized both "the interests 
advanced ... to justify this limitation on protected expression and the 
means chosen to further those interests."133 
The Court concluded that the municipality had "not adequately 
justified its substantial restriction of protected activity."134 Nor was 
128. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 62-65 (1981). 
I 29. Id. at 65-66. Nude dancing continues to receive First Amendment protection, 
although it is grudgingly given by some members of the Court. See Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
I 30. Schad, 452 U.S. at 68. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 71. 
134. Id. at 72. See also Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2377 
(I 995), where, in a case involving government regulation of commercial speech 
(lawyers' targeted direct mail solicitations), the Court said, 
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the ordinance "narrowly drawn to respond to what might be distinctive 
problems arising from certain types of live entertainment."135 The 
municipality failed to establish "that its interests could not be met by 
restrictions that are less intrusive on protected forms of expression."136 
Justice Blackmun, although joining the Court's opinion, wrote to 
"emphasize that the presumption of validity that traditionally attends a 
local government's exercise of its zoning powers carries little, if any, 
weight where the zoning regulation trenches on rights of expression 
protected under the First Amendment."137 He concluded "that in 
attempting to accommodate a locality's concern to protect the character 
of its community life, the Court must remain attentive ... in particular 
to the protection [First Amendment guarantees] afford to minorities 
against the 'standardization of ideas ... by ... dominate political or 
community groups. "'138 
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, troubled because the record 
left "so many relevant questions unanswered."139 He said the Court 
was "left to speculate" why the municipality acted against the bookstores 
and why the ordinance drew a line between forms of entertainment. 140 
the State must demonstrate that the challenged regulation "advances the 
Government's interest 'in a direct and material way."' . . . That burden, we 
have explained, "'is not satisfied by mere speculation and conjecture; rather, 
a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech 
must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will 
in fact alleviate them to a material degree."' 
135. Schad, 452 U.S. at 74. 
136. Id. Compare Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), where Indiana 
used a public indecency statute to require otherwise nude dancers in a private adult 
entertainment establishment to wear pasties and G-strings. However, less narrowly 
applied public indecency statutes may violate the First Amendment. See Triplett Grille, 
Inc. v. Akron, 40 F.3d 129 (6th Cir. 1994). 
137. Schad, 452 U.S. at 77. For a reviewing court to perform its function, he said, 
"the zoning authority must be prepared to articulate, and support, a reasoned and 
significant basis for its decision." Id. Justices Powell and Stewart, in their concurrence, 
noted that the municipality had "failed altogether to justify its broad restriction of 
protected expression." Id. at 79. 
138. Id. at 79 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 
I, 4-5 (1949)). 
139. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
140. Id. at 83-84. Justice Stevens explained his discomfort with the state of the 
record: 
While a municipality need not persuade a federal court that its zoning 
decisions are correct as a matter of policy, when First Amendment interests are 
implicated it must at least be able to demonstrate that a uniform policy in fact 
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He concurred in the Court's judgment because "neither the text of the 
zoning ordinance nor the evidence in the record" demonstrated that the 
municipality "applied narrowly drawn content-neutral standards" to the 
bookstores' activity. 141 
The Court accepted that activity-non-obscene live nude dancing--as 
a form of individual expression entitled to First Amendment protection. 
The Court did not question whether the dancing was intended to 
communicate a specific message. What the following section will argue 
is that residential architecture, the exterior design of a single-family 
house, does send a particularized message to neighbors and passersby, 
a message that can be read much as poetry or prose can. As such, it, 
more so than non-obscene live nude dancing, is entitled to protection 
under the First Amendment. 
IV. 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet said that architecture is 
speech, many students of the subject believe that conclusion is inevita-
ble.142 John Costonis has reached that conclusion, adding that "[f]or 
many, architecture and other environmental features communicate ideas 
exists and is applied in a content-neutral fashion. Presumably, municipalities 
may regulate expressive activity--even protected activity--pursuant to 
narrowly drawn content-neutral standards; however, they may not regulate 
protected activity when the only standard provided is the unbridled discretion 
of a municipal official. 
Id. at 84. 
141. Id. at 84. 
142. See Stephen F. Williams, Subjectivity, Expression, and Privacy: Problems of 
Aesthetic Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REv. I, 22 (1977); Rubin, supra note 114, at 18 I, 
187-88; Kenneth Regan, Note, You Can't Build That Here: The Constitutionality of 
Aesthetic Zoning and Architectural Review, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1013, 1024 (1990). 
However, not all students agree. See Shawn G. Rice, Comment, Zoning Law: 
Architectural Appearance Ordinances and the First Amendment, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 439 
(1993); Lori E. Fields, Note, Aesthetic Regulation and the First Amendment, 3 VA. J. 
NAT. RESOURCES L. 237 (1984). 
Most recently, in a case involving state regulation of a parade, a unanimous Court 
made the following characterization: 
The protected expression that inheres in a parade is not limited to its banners 
and songs, however, for the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words 
as mediums of expression. . . . As some of these examples show, a narrow, 
succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, 
which if confined to expressions conveying a "particularized message," ... 
would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollack, 
music of Arnold Schonberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll. 
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2345 
(1995). 
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more effectively than does language,"143 For example, architecture 
serves as a vehicle for those who work in literature; in tum, literature 
serves as a vehicle for those who work in architecture. 144 Even the 
often mundane architecture of the single-family house is an expression 
more akin to direct oral or written speech than to indirect conduct145 : 
The making of a house is, in a true sense, the laying bare of character. We all 
reveal our needs and our wants in the process; it is not for nothing that 
architects who specialize in houses often joke that they feel more like 
psychiatrists. They not only know what their clients desire ... they know how 
these people react to one another, how they make decisions, how they function 
under pressure, what they value most and what they are willing to sacrifice. 146 
143. COSTONIS, supra note 88, at 94. See also Goldberger, Masterpieces, supra 
note I 13, at 46, describing an architect's client who 
might well be the Platonic version of the architecture-believing patron. · A 
longtime lover of great buildings, she set out from the beginning to produce 
a house that would not only shelter her family but would communicate to them 
and to her friends her enthusiasms and even, she hoped, in some way advance 
the art of architecture. 
144. See Angeline Goreau, The Age of Extravagance, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REv., May 
22, I 994, at 13 (book review). 
(Edith Wharton] regarded each house she lived in-and its garden-as a 
canvas for composition, to be approached as seriously as she did her novels. 
In Wharton's later, more sophisticated work, architecture serves as a 
language, one that accrues substantial consequence in the lives of characters 
whose world dictates that so much must remain unspoken. 
Id.; see also Adam Gopnik, The Ghost of the Glass House, NEW YORKER, May 9, 1994, 
at 54, 66 (discussing the Maison de Verre (the Glass House) ("one of the few modern 
buildings to value function and fantasy equally, without succumbing to the lure of 
historical pastiche---'the one isolated poetic interpretation of the pure glass and steel 
aesthetic,' .... "). The author developed this theme: "The Glass House is like a poem, 
and, like any poem, it presents a universe of possible readings to the contemplative mind 
while remaining fixed, structured, and essentially inalterable---change a word and you've 
ruined the effect." Id. at 69. 
Id. 
145. See Rubin, supra note 114, at 185. 
Like other forms of expression, architecture can serve to express the individual 
personality. An architect---0r the builder of a house working through an 
architect--uses brick as a painter uses canvas or a writer uses words to express 
his notions of beauty and comfort, as well as many of his social values. 
Moreover, a house compatible with one's own tastes can foster creativity, 
peace of mind, and other mental states important to individual happiness and 
well-being. Accordingly, determination of at least the aesthetic features of 
residential architecture warrants constitutional protection like that afforded 
other forms of self-expression. 
146. Paul Goldberger, Raise High the Roof Beams, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Oct. 
6, 1985, at I, 36; see also TRACY KIDDER, HOUSE I 3 (Avon Books ed. I 986)( describing 
a couple who "had imagined in some detail a house that would suit them functionally. 
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If, as this Article argues, the exterior design of a single-family house 
is a statement about the inhabitants' notions of beauty and comfort and 
values, then actions such as the City of Ladue's rejection of the 
Stoyanoffs' unusual design raise significant First Amendment questions, 
questions similar to those raised by the City of Ladue's rejection of Ms. 
Gilleo's window sign. As Gilleo and Schad illustrate, a municipality's 
zoning actions can raise First Amendment questions; this is certainly true 
when the municipality uses aesthetic criteria to evaluate the exterior 
design of a single-family house. 
In using aesthetic criteria to reject a housing design, the municipality 
rejects the proponents, the people who want to build and live in the 
house. The municipality's rejection is a rejection of the proponents' 
character, their needs and wants, their views of what a house should be. 
The municipality says such people and such views are not only 
unwelcome but are a threat to others. The single-family house "is an 
extension of one's own physical being," an expression of personal 
identity and social aspiration. 147 It is a way homeowners "communi-
cate with others about themselves," about their "social status, social 
aspirations, personal identity, individual freedom." 148 To have the 
content of that communication rejected as grotesque is to suffer a 
significant rejection indeed. 
It is both the direct and personal nature of the homeowner's expres-
sion which makes it's speech more akin to oral and written speech than 
to conduct-conveyed expression such as non-obscene live nude dancing. 
Architecture contains content which is intended to be read like prose or 
poetry. One of Robert Venturi's breakthroughs was the explicit 
application of literary critical theory to both the analysis and construction 
. . . But they were stuck on the question, among others, of what style of house theirs 
should be. How should it look to their new neighbors, to their mends, and to people 
passing by ... "). 
147. The Home, supra note 127, at 58. 
148. Id. See also Herbert Muschamp, Ten Little Houses and How They Grew, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. I 6, I 994, at H40, reviewing a show of residential architecture: 
Clearly, this is a highly polemical show .... At heart, it is a response to the 
conservative crusade for family values and to the "neo-traditional" housing ... 
which embody that crusade in architectural form. The IO projects add up to 
a protest against attempts to impose rigid social norms on a diverse society. 
If there's any logic to the idea that private houses can perform this political 
function, it goes something like this: Families live in houses. Architects 
design them. Their designs reflect prevailing social attitudes. As those 
attitudes change, the designs change. And perhaps designers can accelerate 
social change by representing progressive attitudes in built form. 
The author said, "[t]here are sound historical reasons for proceeding with this logic." 
Id. 
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of architecture. 149 This is seen in his residential architecture: "At their 
best, [Venturi's houses] merge a kind of childlike delight with an adult's 
ironic sensibility, bringing to architecture an attitude not altogether 
different from that which Lewis Carroll brought to literature."150 
Venturi's message, in words and construction, has been "in many ways 
sensible enough: the ambiguities and complexities which certain critics 
. . . find essential to literary value, are equally valid for architec-
ture. "1 s1 
For Venturi, writing and building are inextricably linked; each is a 
medium of expression, and the content of one reinforces the content of 
the other: "Writing was important to us as younger architects before we 
had the opportunity to express ideas through building. . . . Writing, for 
us, is part of a cycle of development that results in both theory and 
building: we look, analyze, synthesize through writing, synthesize 
through design, then look again."152 Or, as Venturi noted, "[w]hen my 
ideas about building exceed my opportunities to build, I get the ideas out 
in words rather than bricks and mortar."153 Venturi believes that 
readers appreciate architecture for its associational quality rather than for 
any abstract aesthetic resonance; he thus works to make his buildings 
"readable and familiar again for its users as well as for a larger 
public."154 He was the first to coherently and persuasively advocate 
"that architecture, like language, has semiological components that can 
be effectively utilised to send signals to those experiencing it," that 
149. See Vincent Scully, Preface to ROBERT VENTURI, COMPLEXITY AND 
CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE 13 (2d ed. 1977) ("[T.S.J Eliot discusses analysis and 
comparison as tools of literary criticism. These critical methods are valid for 
architecture too: architecture is open to analysis like any other aspect of experience, and 
is made more vivid by comparisons."); see also Hughes, supra note 116, at 52 ("Apart 
ftom age, the main thing [Post-modern architects] have in common is a fascination with 
architecture as language. When tradition ... appears in their work, it is quoted rather 
than adhered to. There is no common style."). 
150. Paul Goldberger, Robert Venturi-In Love With the Art of Building, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1982, at H27, H28. 
15!. Joseph Rykwert, Book Review, DOMUS, Aug. 1967, at 23 (reviewing ROBERT 
VENTURI, COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE (1966)). 
152. Denise s. Brown, Introduction to A VIEW FROM THE CAMPIDOGLIO: SELECTED 
ESSAYS 1953-1984 9 (Peter Arnell et al. eds., 1984). 
153. Robert Venturi, The RIBA Annual Discourse, in VIEW FROM THE 
CAMPIDOGLIO, supra note l 04, at l 04. 
154. VON Moos, supra note 101, at 30. 
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architecture "is no longer considered to be like a text, but has become 
the text itself."155 
Venturi's critical literary interests led him, as an architect, to reject 
any absolutist approach to architectural problem solving. 156 Quite the 
contrary. Venturi concluded that architecture needed to recognize and, 
occasionally, celebrate the problems; he argued for the acceptance of 
designs which recognized architecture's complexities and contradictions. 
Designs which excluded these complexities and contradictions risked 
"separating architecture from the experience of life and the needs of 
society."157 The architect need not hide from insoluble problems but 
can openly express them; "in an inclusive rather than an exclusive kind 
of architecture there is room for the fragment, for contradiction, for 
improvisation, and for the tensions these produce."158 
Yet, an acceptance of architectural complexity and contradiction does 
not mean that the resulting building must be discordant or even difficult 
to decipher. Venturi's architecture speaks in an easily understandable 
way. 159 He knows that the single-family house serves as a "means of 
self-expression" for the residents; 160 his housing designs can be read 
easily, coherently, logically and yet can be regarded, eventually, as 
masterworks. 161 Venturi can build as well as write, can express in a 
155. James Steele, Living the Legend in Philadelphia, in VENTURI, SCOTT BROWN 
& ASSOCIATES ON HOUSES AND HOUSING 9 (1992). 
156. See VON Moos, supra note 101, at 11 ("From the literary aesthetics of 
complexity and contradiction that interested Venturi, new priorities did indeed emerge. 
The question was not so much how to ·solve' ... complicated problems ... with the 
simplest means possible. . . . Rather, the question was how to design while allowing for 
the existence of such problems."). 
157. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 17. 
158. Id. 
159. See Fowler, supra note 117, at 429 ("Apparently, the message [Venturi] would 
like to see in architectural forms is a statement not about the physical forces acting on 
the structure or the constructional problems heroically surmounted, but something easily 
understandable about the function the building has in the local milieu."); see also Filler, 
supra note 123, at 57. 
Id. 
Venturi and Rauch have carried off bravura effects in the past with an 
apparent ease that eludes even the best of their would-be imitators. . . . These 
architects have an undeniable gift for choosing images whose associations 
summon up resonant responses, and Venturi & Rauch's success in doing so 
has been tied directly to their very informed selection of those images. 
160. The Home, supra note 127, at 58. 
161. See Frederic Schwartz, Foreword, MOTHER'S HOUSE: THE EVOLUTION OF 
VANNA VENTURJ'S HOUSE IN CHESTNUT HILL 11 (Frederic Schwartz ed. 1992), 
discussing the house Venturi built for his mother: "The [house is] ... a small domestic 
masterpiece that challenged the definition of modem architecture and redefined the 
conception of what a house should look like. Its historical references, use of symbolism, 
color, and ornament were profound and provocative during a period of almost universal 
acceptance of orthodox modem design." See also Thomas Beeby, Association and 
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house meanings as clear as if written on the walls.162 His houses as 
text, are "a clear and cogent translation of the Venturi principles into 
actual building."163 And it is a text, an expression, for the inhabitants 
who, after all, must commission or accept the architect's work; this is 
seen in the following reading of a weekend house designed by Venturi: 
As a weekend house for a New York couple, this little building i&--like all of 
Venturi & Rauch 's house&--an act of art patronage, however modest and 
workable it may be. It embodies a statement, by the owners as well as the 
architects, about the traditions of home in America. It says all that need be said 
about the desire for convenience with a bit of grandiloquence, about bucolic 
ideas vs. urbanity, about formal organization with vernacular liberties. It puts 
all our domestic memories into one little box. 164 
Dissociation: The Trubeck and Wislocki Houses, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF ROBERT 
VENTURI 68, 81 (Christopher Mead ed., 1989), discussing another Venturi designed 
house: "The exterior hierarchy of window and door types allows one to read the 
Wislocki House simply, without clues other than size and position. The entire building 
can be interpreted as a coherent organization of pragmatic concerns and the logical 
expression of elements." 
162. See Complexities and Contradictions, PROGRESSIVE ARCHITECTURE, May 1965, 
at 168. 
Architects often explain verbally what they wish their work to transmit on 
an intuitive level. In many cases, they claim a meaning for their architecture 
that is not present in the finished building; in other cases, their words are as 
dull as their buildings. But in [Venturi's mother's] house, without the 
architect's words and on the level simply of experience, one can feel the 
polarities and tensions of the architecture. 
Id. See also COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 118, where Venturi 
discusses the same house: 
(The house] recognizes complexities and contradictions: it is both complex 
and simple, open and closed, big and little; some of its elements are good on 
one level and bad on another; its order accomodates the generic elements of 
the house in general, and the circumstantial elements of a house in particular. 
It achieves the difficult unity of a medium number of diverse parts rather than 
the easy unity of few or many motival parts. 
163. Paul Goldberger, Tract House, Celebrated, N.Y. TIMES MAG. Sept. 14, 1975, 
at 68; see also Hughes, supra note 116, at 58 ("Nothing in this [Venturi designed 
vacation house] could be called revivalist; everything is quotation and proposition, 
exaggerated detail held in parantheses. Venturi seems to be expressing the same sort of 
relationship to the past that theorizing mannerist architects ... had with Michaelangelo's 
more heroic prototypes."). 




To accept the exterior design of a single-family house as a text entitled 
to First Amendment protection runs smack into a wall; certainly the 
Stoyanoffs ran into it in Ladue, Missouri when they sought to build an 
unusual looking single-family residence. A municipality such as Ladue 
may not only enact zoning laws, but may enforce them based on its 
aesthetic evaluation of the exterior design of a proposed building. 
It was not always so. Until 1954, aesthetic criteria were, at most, 
accepted only as ancillary considerations in zoning decisions. The 
prevailing view was that government should not regulate aesthetics 
because it could neither adequately define aesthetic standards nor ensure 
evenhanded application of them. 165 Even when a municipality appar-
ently did regulate for aesthetic reasons, the courts would perform 
analytical contortions to apply the seemingly less troublesome standards 
of health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 
An example is Gorieb v. Fox. 166 The landowner wanted to build a 
store on the street line in a residential area where the zoning ordinance 
required a set-back from the street line. The landowner challenged the 
set-back ordinance on constitutional grounds. 
The year before, the Court had decided Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co. where a landowner had challenged the constitutionality of a 
municipality's comprehensive zoning ordinance. 167 The Euclid Court 
noted that urban life was no longer simple, that "with the great increase 
and concentration of population, problems have developed, and 
constantly are developing, which require, and will continue to require, 
additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private 
lands in urban communities."168 The question in Euclid involved "the 
validity of what is really the crux of the more recent zoning legislation, 
namely, the creation and maintenance of residential districts, from which 
business and trade of every sort, including hotels and apartment houses, 
are excluded."169 
The Court concluded that such exclusions were factually well-founded, 
noting that 
reports, which bear every evidence of painstaking consideration, concur in the 
view that the segregation of residential, business, and industrial buildings will 
I 65. COSTONIS, supra note 88, at 20. 
166. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927). 
167. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926). 
168. Id. at 386-87. 
169. Id. at 390. 
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make it easier to provide fire apparatus suitable for the character and intensity 
of the development in each section; that it will increase the safety and security 
of home life; greatly tend to prevent street accidents, especially to children, by 
reducing the traffic and resulting confusion in residential sections; decrease 
noise and other conditions which produce or intensify nervous disorders; 
preserve a more favorable environment in which to rear children, etc.' 70 
Such reasons were "sufficiently cogent" to preclude the Court from 
saying "as it must be said before the ordinance can be declared 
unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreason-
able, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, 
or general welfare."171 
The Gorieb Court characterized Euclid as validating "comprehensive 
zoning laws and ordinances, prescribing, among other things, the height 
of buildings ... and the extent of the area to be left open for light and 
air and in aid of fire protection, etc."172 Echoing Euclid, Gorieb -
concerned with "the vast changes in the extent and complexity of the 
problems of modem city life" - said the municipality was better 
qualified to deal with these conditions and could do so undisturbed "by 
the courts unless [its conclusions are] clearly arbitrary and unreason-
able."173 The conclusions reached by the municipality in Gorieb were 
not arbitrary and unreasonable; the members of the city council 
concluded "that front yards afford room for lawns and trees, keep the 
dwellings farther from the dust, noise and fumes of the street, add to the 
attractiveness and comfort of a residential district, create a better home 
environment, and ... reduce the fire hazard."174 These conclusions 
were sufficient to satisfy the Euclid standard that the ordinance have a 
rational relation to the public safety, health, moral, or general welfare. 
Although Euclid spoke in terms of preserving a favorable environment, 
and Gorieb spoke in terms of preserving an area's attractiveness and 
comfort, those words did not cause a flood of aesthetic-based zoning 
ordinances; as noted, until 1954, aesthetics were an ancillary--not a 
primary-basis for zoning regulation. And, when the floodgates were 
opened, it seemed almost by accident. The opening came in Berman v. 
I 70. Id. at 394. 
171. Id. at 395. 
172. Gorieb, 274 U.S. at 608 (citation omitted). 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 609. 
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Parker where landowners raised a Fifth Amendment challenge to 
congressional urban renewal legislation for the District of Columbia. 175 
A unanimous Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, rejected the 
challenge. In doing so, the Court clearly signaled its unwillingness to 
be drawn into a review of aesthetic-based police power actions, actions 
which are "the product of legislative determinations addressed to the 
purposes of govemment." 176 Those legislative determinations are 
"well-nigh conclusive"; the judiciary's scope of review "is an extremely 
narrow one"177: 
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not 
desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values 
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It 
is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should 
be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well 
as carefully patrolled. . . . If those who govern ... decide that the Nation's 
Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth 
Amendment that stands in the way. 178 
The Court would not "oversee" such decisions; they rested "in the 
discretion of the legislative branch."179 
Although it spoke in terms similar to Euclid and Gorieb, Berman was 
interpreted as marking "a startling break with the past;"180 the decision 
initiated a flood of legislative and judicial activity "embracing the 
Berman attitude that legislating soley for beauty or aesthetics is fully 
within the purview of the police power."181 For the courts especially, 
Berman became talismanic; they "have used the discretion that Berman 
175. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (I 954). 
176. Id. at 32. 
I 77. Id. 
178. Id. at 33 (citation omitted). 
179. Id. at 35-36. 
180. Scott Schrader, Book Note, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (1991) (reviewing 
JOHN J. COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS: LAW, AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHANGE). 
181. James C. Smith, Review Essay: Law, Beauty, and Human Stability: A Rose 
is a Rose is a Rose, 78 CAL. L. REV. 787, 790 (1990); see also Schrader, supra note 
I 80, at 1790. 
Id. 
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[Berman] was widely understood to signal the Court's willingness to allow 
government efforts to beautify communities; for the law of aesthetics, it 
marked a startling break with the past. . . . Lower courts completely reversed 
their attitudes toward aesthetic initiatives, and legislatures responded with an 
outpouring of statutes and statutorily created administrative agencies .... The 
judiciary, taking Berman as a high court harbinger of a new direction for this 
area of the law, seemed amenable to almost any such program, and began to 
function as little more than a rubber-stamp reviewer of these efforts. 
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affords . . . as a basis for upholding almost any aesthetic regula-
tion."182 
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to stem this flood in Village 
of Belle Terre v. Boraas but declined to do so. 183 Unlike Berman, 
which involved a Fifth Amendment challenge to congressional legisla-
tion, Belle Terre involved, in part, a First Amendment challenge to 
municipal legislation. A municipal ordinance "restricted land use to one-
family dwellings" and defined family to include "[a] number of persons 
not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeep-
ing unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage .... "184 
Six students living together in a leased house challenged the ordinance 
as violating their associational and other constitutional rights. 
As he did in Berman, Justice Douglas wrote for the Court. He 
summarily rejected the students' substantive constitutional claims, 
finding that the ordinance "involves no 'fundamental right' guaranteed 
by the Constitution" such as the rights of association and privacy. 185 
He then explicitly extended Berman to validate the municipality's 
ordinance: 
Id. 
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles 
restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family 
needs. This goal is a permissible one within Berman . . . . The police power 
is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample 
to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet 
seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people. 186 
182. Williams, supra note 142, at 2; see also Smith, supra note 181, at 790. 
In the decades since Berman, the modem view validating aesthetic regulation 
has become firmly entrenched. . . . The new rule has served as the catalyst 
and prime legal prop for a wide variety of programs, ranging from historic 
preservation and the protection of scenic vistas to public architectural and 
landscaping controls. Most courts have extended their full blessing to aesthetic 
regulation, according it coequal status with the more traditional police power 
objectives. A few modern courts have sought a middle ground, characterizing 
aesthetics as a proper, but less weighty, legislative end than health and safety 
concerns, and therefore meriting less judicial deference. 
183. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974). 
184. Id. at 2. 
l 85. Id. at 7. 
186. Id. at 9. Earlier, he wrote that in Berman, the Court "refused to limit the 
concept of public welfare that may be enhanced by zoning regulations." Id. at 5. 
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As the Stoyanoffs discovered, decisions such as Berman and Belle 
Terre have encouraged the enactment of ordinances and the establish-
ment of review boards which aesthetically regulate the exterior design 
of new and existing structures, including the single-family house. 187 
And, as the Stoyanoffs also discovered, decisions such as Berman and 
Belle Terre have validated a judicial laissez-faire attitude toward such 
ordinances, perhaps much to the judiciary's relief. 188 
But this abdication has a price, a steep and unacceptable one if the 
exterior design of the single-family house is accepted as expressing, as 
clearly as words, who and what the occupants are or wish to be, both 
individually and as members of a community. 189 The law, through its 
judges and its judgments, affects this expression and should protect it, 
absent a sufficiently substantial showing by the government under 
narrow, clearly defined standards. 190 
187. See Regan, supra note 142, at 1015-16. The extent of the flood can be seen 
in James P. Karp, The Evolving Meaning of Aesthetics in Land-Use Regulation, 15 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 307, 313-14 n.35 (1990). 
188. See COSTONIS, supra note 88, at 20. And that judicial relief may be, in part, 
relief at being insulated from having to wrestle with the slippery problem of aesthetic 
definition; see also Williams, supra note 142, at 18-19. 
Id. 
The problem of articulating aesthetic standards represents perhaps the extreme 
case of polycentricity. The number of potential designs is infinite; the choice 
as to any single factor, say materials, has an impact on all other factors; and 
one cannot identify any non-aesthetic features that will even begin to 
consistently justify the application of any aesthetic concept. At least in other 
instances of polycentricity one can usually say that certain characteristics will 
invariably be assets. In attempting to articulate aesthetic standards, however, 
one cannot say even that much, for the use of stone, or rectilinearity, or 
inclusion of windows, or any other nonaesthetic feature, is not invariably a 
Hplus." 
189. As Witold Rybczynski has noted, architecture, unlike other arts, "exists not 
solely as a vehicle for the skill or expression of the architect but as an object with a 
function." R YBCZYNSKI, supra note 114, at I 88. The architect is occupied with "the 
fulfillment of mundane uses ... to an extent unknown to sculptors or painters." Id. 
In the sense that design and construction involve many people, architecture is 
a collective pursuit. But buildings are also the product of society as a 
whole--of legislation, of wealth, of technology, of custom, and, above all, of 
cultural traditions. That is why buildings are so precious: they tell us who 
and what we are--or wish to be-----not only as individuals but as a community. 
Id. at I 91. 
190. See Fitzgerald, supra note 90, at 2051-52. 
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To acknowledge the creative quality of law is to recognize its kinship to 
other endeavors traditionally called "art." Inasmuch as it creates visual 
realities within the confines of the canvas, art, too, is a builder of worlds. Yet, 
while both art and law exhibit a capacity for creativity, they do so in 
dramatically different ways. A work of art is, at one level, an overt expression 
of the artist's will to create: A central purpose of the artistic endeavor is to 
bring into being an object that has not existed in concrete form before the 
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What has happened in single-family housing is what we would never 
permit to happen in other First Amendment activities. There has been 
a homogenization of expression, a "predisposition toward accepted 
design standards," and "a built-in prejudice that insulates against a 
confrontation with more profound and disturbing questions."191 Cities 
and villages, townships and boroughs, have acquired an almost 
unreviewable authority to impose aesthetic standards on single-family 
housing----.<;tandards which avoid "the distractions of sensory or 
perceptual stimulation" and which create "a condition of conformity that 
makes it impossible to differentiate one locale from another."192 
What the Stoyanoffs experienced was a municipality's application of 
an idea that, architecturally, "there is one dominant and correct canon of 
taste in our culture and that any [design] where this canon has not been 
followed is deviant and inferior." 193 Architecture is the only art where 
this idea is legislatively enacted and judicially accepted; "in most fields 
and media other than those of architecture, the hetereogenous quality and 
ethnic diversity of American culture is accepted and is considered one 
of the strengths of our culture."194 The result is a distrust of architec-
tural "variety and richness," a preference for "bureaucracy and standard-
ization."195 But municipalities cannot standardize the sense of comfort 
and well-being that individuals find for themselves in their houses and 
which they express to their neighbors. 196 Whatever the reason for the 
Id. 
creative act. Law's creative quality is far less conspicuous .... Nevertheless, 
judicial allocation of rights and responsibilities undeniably shapes legal 
relationships among parties, patterning not only their own worlds, but also the 
larger worlds that they inhabit. 
191. James Wines, The Case for the Big Duck, ARCHITECTURAL FORUM Apr. 1972, 
at 60. 
I 92. Id. 
193. Robert Venturi, A Definition of Architecture as Shelter with Decoration on It, 
and Another Plea for a Symbolism of the Ordinary in Architecture, in VIEW FROM THE 
CAMPIDOGLIO, supra note l04, at 66. 
194. Id. 
195. Safdie, supra note 97, at 64. 
196. See The Home, supra note 127, at 231-32. 
Most people ... recognize comfort when they experience it. This recognition 
involves a combination of sensations . . . and not only physical, but also 
emotional as well as intellectual, which makes comfort difficult to explain and 
impossible to measure. But that does not make it any less real. ... Domestic 
well-being ... is, as it always has been, the business of the family and the 
individual. We must rediscover for ourselves the mystery of comfort, for 
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design they selected, the Stoyanoffs certainly did not do so to be 
discomforted; that house was, after all, where they wanted to live. 
The Missouri court's rejection of the Stoyanoffs' design-because it 
was considered unsuitable to the neighborhood's character and adverse 
to the general welfare----was based on decisions from Wisconsin and 
Ohio. Like the Stoyanoffs, the landowner in the Wisconsin case, State 
ex rel. Save/and Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, complied with all 
residential zoning requirements except for obtaining a building board's 
approval of the exterior design. 197 Although the opinion does not 
describe the proposed design or the design of surrounding houses, the 
court characterized the municipality as "a highly desirable residential 
village, almost entirely built up of single family residences."198 
Apparently the Building Board found that the exterior design of the 
proposed residence was "so at variance with ... the exterior architectur-
al appeal and functional plan of the structures ... in the immediate 
neighborhood ... 'as to cause a substantial depreciation in the property 
values of said neighborhood. "'199 
The trial court had invalidated the ordinance, in rart because it was 
"grounded largely upon aesthetic considerations."20 In reversing, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that where previous cases had 
established a general rule that "the zoning power may not be exercised 
for purely aesthetic considerations," Berman had rendered "it extremely 
doubtful that such prior rule is any longer the law."201 Acknowledging 
that Berman was a Fifth Amendment case, not a Fourteenth Amendment 
case, the court considered "such distinction to be immaterial in 
considering the scope of the police power and its exercise to promote the 
general welfare."202 The court concluded that the ordinance "consti-
tutes a valid exercise of the police power ... and its provisions are not 
so indefinite or ambiguous as to subject applicants for building permits 
to the uncontrolled arbitrary discretion or caprice of the Building 
Board. "203 
The Ohio case relied on in Stoyanoff was Reid v. Architectural Board 
of Review of Cleveland Heights. 204 Ms. Reid submitted plans to build 
without it, our dwellings will indeed be machines instead of homes. 
Id. 
197. 69 N.W.2d 217,219 (Wis. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955). 
198. Id. at 219. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 222. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 223. 
203. Id. at 224. 
204. 192 N.E.2d 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963). 
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a house on North Park Boulevard in Cleveland Heights, a suburb 
"organized to provide suitable and comfortable home surroundings for 
residents employed in Cleveland"; Cleveland Heights "is a well-regulated 
and carefully groomed community, primarily residential in charac-
ter."205 The buildings on North Park Boulevard "are, in the main, 
dignified, stately and conventional structures, two and one-half stories 
high_,,206 
Ms. Reid's proposed house was none of that. It was "a flat-roofed 
complex of twenty modules, each of which is ten feet high, twelve feet 
square ... arranged in a loosely formed 'U'."207 The house walls 
were mostly glass, opening onto a garden; the rest were cement panels. 
The house, the garage, and "their associated garden walls, trellises and 
courts, form a series of interior and exterior spaces, all under a canopy 
of trees and baffled from the street by a garden wall."208 That wall 
blocked a view of the house from the street.209 
Ms. Reid submitted this design to the review board which disapproved 
"this project for the reason that it does not maintain the high character 
of community development in that it does not conform to the character 
of the houses in the area."210 The board conceded "that this structure 
would be a very interesting home placed in a different environ-
ment."211 But, "placed on North Park Boulevard, it would not only be 
out of keeping with and a radical departure from the structures now 
standing but would be most detrimental to the further development of 
the area . . .. "212 In addition, the design was "of such a radical 
concept that any design not conforming to the general character of the 
neighborhood would have to be thereafter approved .... "213 
Wieland, Reid, and Stoyanoff are representative of post-Berman 
aesthetic-based cases and are representative of their dangers. Such cases 
assume that there is an aesthetic certainty or, at least, an aesthetic 
205. Id. at 76. 
206. Id. at 77. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. As the court described it, "it is just a high wall with no indication of what is 
behind it. Not only does the house fail to conform in any manner with the other 
buildings but presents no identification that it is a structure for people to live in." Id. 
210. Id. at 75 (quoting the order of the Architectual Board). 




consensus when it comes to the exterior design of single-family houses. 
Such cases allow municipalities to express that certainty and enforce that 
consensus without fear of judicial oversight or override. Such cases do 
not allow for an individuality of expression such as that offered by Ms. 
Reid or the Stoyanoffs.214 Such cases deny the value of multiplicity, 
the stimulus of the different, the existence of architectural complexity 
and contradiction which Robert Venturi has described and celebrat-
ed.21s 
Venturi's work calls "for an environment worthy of the inherent 
eccentricities, and all the disparity of facts and values which constitute 
a democratic society"; architecture, particularly in the single-family 
home, should "be the expression of the pluralistic value systems of a 
democratically inspired vision of life with its respect for the uniqueness 
of each individual."216 This diversity is fertile; sameness is sterile.217 
An architecture which accepts complexity and contradiction 
"accomodates the intimations of local context over the dogma of 
universality," "provides pragmatic solutions to real problems rather than 
easy obedience to ideal forms," "solves problems, but expresses them 
too."21s 
There are courts which, while not embracing Venturi's philosophy, 
have refused to passively accept municipal efforts at aesthetic homogeni-
zation. An early example is Hankins v. Borough of Rockleigh.219 The 
Hankins wanted to build a one-family "modem two-story dwelling with 
214. See Denise S. Brown, Learning the Wrong Lessons From the Beaux-Arts, in 
A VIEW FROM THE CAMPIDOGLIO, supra note 104, at 68. 
Id. 
[W]here aesthetic certainty exists in the profession, for example on design 
review boards, it supports a deadening architectural mediocrity. . . . If we are 
looking for aesthetic unity, perhaps we should try to discover our own shared 
aesthetic values; but there is probably no possibility of a broad-based aesthetic 
consensus for us today. Perhaps we should not seek it, but rather try to enjoy 
our diversity. 
215. However, at least at the outset, very few joined Venturi in that celebration. 
See VINCENT SCULLY, AMERlCAN ARCHITECTLRE AND URBANISM 229 (1969) ("The 
principles of compromise and multiplicity suggested [in COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADIC-
TION] have never been popular in America, despite the pluralism of the American 
condition. It is undoubtedly because of that very heterogeneity that Americans have so 
often preferred 'unifying' homogenized solutions."). 
216. Naomi Miller, Book Review, JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY OF ARCHITECTURAL 
HISTORJANS 319, 3 I 9 (Dec. I 967) (reviewing ROBERT VENTURJ, COMPLEXITY AND 
CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE ( 1966)). 
217. See Nancy Love, The Deflatable Fair, PHILADELPHIA MAGAZINE 140 (Apr. 
1969) describing Venturi's belief "that the simplifying and excluding principles of the 
modem movement in architecture have produce sterility and that this approach to order 
hasn't worked." 
218. Venturi, supra note 104, at 108. 
219. 150 A.2d 63 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959). 
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a partial flat roof.'mo They were denied a building permit because the 
municipality said their design did not conform to the existing houses. 
The New Jersey court found this denial "clearly and palpably unreason-
able in the light of the actual physical development of the municipality" 
which had spawned a variety of housing styles.221 The municipality's 
denial of the Hankins' permit was "an arbitrary denial ... of a 
legitimate use of their property without any colorable vestige of social 
justification in terms of the general welfare or any other facet of the 
police power. "222 
Twenty years later, in Morristown Road Associates v. Borough of 
Bernardsville, the New Jersey court had occasion to consider, for the 
first time, whether the standards in a design review ordinance were "so 
broad and vague as to be incapable of being objectively applied, thereby 
permitting arbitrary action[s]."223 The ordinance--which sought to 
enhance the municipality's desirability, preserve property values, and 
promote general welfare---required designs which were "harmonious 
with the character of existing development," which avoided a "displeas-
ing monotony of design," and which were not inconsistent "with 
established architectural character in any neighborhood."224 
As a starting point, the court said any zoning ordinance "must be clear 
and capable of being understood and complied with by the property 
owner."225 This was "particularly applicable" to architectural design 
ordinances "[b]ecause of the subjective elements which can be involved" 
and because of the enforcement process: "As design controls are 
enforced by administrative agencies, the prerequisite of definitiveness 
will only be met when the standards sufficiently confine the process of 
220. Id. at 64. 
221. As the court described it, 
[t]his is an extremely small community in area. Half the old-style houses 
are already partly out of their original architectural design because of the 
addition of flat-roofed extensions. There are in existence almost as many 
structures (of all kinds) fully out of character with the architectural restrictions 
for dwellings set forth in the ordinance as those which comply with them. 
Whatever new homes have been erected in the municipality in recent years 
have been of modern style. These considerations are particularly cogent in the 
relatively immediate vicinity of [the Hankins'] property. 
Id. at 66. 
222. Id. 
223. 394 A.2d 157, 158 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978). 
224. Id. at I 62-63. 
225. Id. at 161. 
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administrative decision and provide a court with an understandable 
criterion for review."226 After reviewing cases---including Wieland, 
Reid, and Stoyanoff-which had considered whether "look-alike 
standards have been considered adequate to support design review 
ordinances," the court concluded that the ordinance under review did not 
contain narrowly and clearly defined standards.227 The ordinance thus 
offered "no workable guidelines to one seeking approval of plans" and 
no workable guidelines by which a reviewing court could determine 
"when a decision has been arbitrary or capricious."228 
Although the aesthetic guidelines were not workable, the municipality 
in Bernardsville at least attempted to establish some; the municipality in 
De Sena v. Village of Hempstead 229 did not even do that. The 
landowner in De Sena wanted to build a twenty- foot wide house on his 
property, a design which the municipality's board of zoning appeals 
described as "an aesthetic abomination," a design which was neither 
"desirable" nor "functional," a design "with a bowling alley appearance" 
which would depress property values and adversely affect the area's 
aesthetic character. 230 
The New York Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that some 
land-use regulation could be based on aesthetic considerations, cautioned 
that in such cases "the public interest in regulation is not necessarily as 
strong as in those cases involving threats to the public safety, and care 
must be taken lest the State 'trespass through aesthetics on the human 
personality. "'231 In De Sena, the zoning board acted without "specific 
authorization which provides sufficient guidance to prevent complete 
arbitrariness."232 Without that authorization, the board could not 
prevent the landowner from building his bowling alley house. 
Id. 
226. Id. 
227. See id. at 162-63. 
The basic criterion for design review under the ordinance is harmony with 
existing structures and terrain. This standard does not adequately circumscribe 
the process of administrative decision nor does it provide an understandable 
criterion for judicial review. It vests the design review committee ... with 
too broad a discretion, and permits determinations based upon whim, caprice 
or subjective considerations. Harmony of design and appearance is conceptual. 
A proposal which is considered harmonious and appropriate by one person 
may be deemed displeasing by another. A standard which permits such 
evaluations does not meet the test of certainty and definiteness required of 
zoning regulations. 
228. Id. at 163. 
229. 379 N.E.2d 1144 (N.Y. 1978). 
230. Id. at 1146. 
231. Id. (Citation omitted). 
232. Id. 
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The Illinois Court of Appeals has also dealt with architectural design 
ordinances which, like that in Bernardsville, tried, but failed, to give the 
reviewing authority sufficient guidance to prevent arbitrary actions. In 
Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Village of Olympia Fields, the landowner 
applied to build a single-family house in a subdivision.233 The land-
owner was denied a building permit "because the proposed construction 
was 'architecturally similar' to other buildings in the area."234 The 
ordinance recited "that 'excessive similarity, dissimilarity or inappropri-
ateness in exterior design and appearance of property' adversely affects 
the desirability, stability, economic and taxable value, and the like, of 
nearby property. "235 The court concluded that the ordinance "fails to 
prescribe adequate standards to control the actions of the Architectural 
Advisory Committee in determining whether or not an application shall 
be approved or disapproved, and confers too broad a discretion on the 
Committee in this regard. "236 
The same result was reached in R.S.T. Builders, Inc. v. Village of 
Bolingbrook.237 This time, the proposed single-family house was 
rejected as being architecturally dissimilar to its neighbors; the design 
review committee "wanted shutters put on the windows, lights on the 
outside, aluminum siding, a brick veneer front, and a two-car ga-
rage. "238 The court found that the ordinance which authorized the 
committee to make such demands was, like the ordinance in Pacesetter, 
"unconstitutionally vague and indefinite."239 It "completely fails to 
prescribe adequate standards to control the actions of the Commit-
tee."240 Like Pacesetter, the ordinance conferred "too broad a discre-
tion on the Committee."241 
Were there a template for making aesthetic judgments, these cases 
would not arise. But architecture is an art; is creative, not formulaic; it 
is individual and temporal. As Robert Venturi noted in a twenty-fifth 
anniversary discussion of the house he built for his mother, "[ w ]hat 
233. 244 N.E.2d 369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
234. Id. at 370. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 373. 
237. 489 N.E.2d 1151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), appeal denied, (1986). 
238. Id. at 1152. 




seemed extraordinary then seems ordinary now---or vice versa. This 
kind of misreckoning occurs especially in matters of taste where we see 
yesterday in the context of today and through the eyes of today."242 
Perspectives and tastes change. What seemed startling or grotesque or 
appalling may now seem solid and beautiful and even totemic; what then 
seemed admirable and comfortable now seems weak and flimsy.243 
Robert Venturi understands that in architecture, even in that devoted 
to the single-family house, "nothing is final and perfect and that human 
beings must give and take a little all the time."244 It is that give and 
take, the ambiguity and tension, the complexity and contradiction, those 
"oscillating relationships," which give expressive vitality to architec-
ture,245 even that represented by Venturi's mother's house: 
Venturi 's education suggested that this house should not be designed to be too 
original, though it is, or to make a point, though it does, but to solve real 
problems in ways that communicate both questions and answers. It is only 
now, with the passage of three decades, that certain things become clear. Its 
design is both straightforward and idiosyncratic, ideological and witty, and 
visionary and practical. . . . The simplicity of its front elevation masks its 
intellectual complexity. ' 46 
Venturi 's exaltation of pluralism over purism is not irresponsible; it does 
not encourage esoteric or intolerant or dogmatic architecture.247 He 
did not argue against one canon of taste merely to replace it with 
242. Robert Venturi, Mother's House: 25 Years Later, in MOTHER'S HOUSE: THE 
EVOLUTION OF VANNA VENTURI'S HOUSE IN CHESTNUT HILL 34 (Frederic Schwartz ed., 
1992). See also Robert Venturi, A/var Aalto, in A VIEW FROM THE CAMPIDOGLIO, supra 
note 104, at 60, where Venturi discusses the work of another architect: "Like all work 
that lives beyond its time, Aalto's can be interpreted in many ways. Each interpretation 
is more or less true for its moment because work of such quality has many dimensions 
and layers of meaning." 
243. See RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 114, at 155. "Buildings, like people, should not 
be judged at the moment of birth. They need time to establish themselves in their 
surroundings, time for their inhabitants to occupy them and for the newness to wear off 
Unlike books, completed buildings should be a little dog-eared before they are 
reviewed." Id. Earlier, the author noted that, "it can no longer be taken for granted that 
buildings will last. What appears to be an admirable and provocative architectural 
statement today may be shown with the passage of time to have been a misguided and 
flimsy attempt at novelty." Id. at xvi-xvii. 
244. SCULLY, supra note 215, at 229. 
245. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 20. 
246. Schwartz, supra note 161, at 14. 
24 7. See COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 17 ("The recognition 
of complexity in architecture does not negate what Louis Kahn has called 'the desire for 
somplicity.' But aesthetic simplicity which is a satisfaction to the mind derives, when 
valid and profound, from inner complexity."); see also Venturi, supra note 153, at 105 
("The aesthetic pluralism of our society encourages an expansive scope for architecture 
at the same time that it discourages approaches that are esoteric, intolerant, and 
dogmatic. It encourages realism as well as idealism; it projects the architect as follower 
as well as leader."). 
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another. There can not be, nor should there be, a universal touchstone 
for art; that would give us sterility, not vitality.248 
Venturi is the proponent of inclusion, not exclusion; of individual 
design rather than total control. He views architecture as a language 
with a grammar and syntax, with images and concepts, with the capacity 
to recall shared images and project new ideas. He is "a polyglot who is 
not settled to any particular linguistic tradition and who might very well 
carry on his correspondence in a number of languages, picking the best 
words from each source."249 Venturi finds meaning in what is built; 
he expresses meaning in what he builds.250 And, as John Costonis 
recently pointed out, "[w]here there's meaning, there are usually a host 
of First Amendment issues lurking nearby."251 Costonis concluded, as 
does this Article, that "it is ... clear that legal aesthetics is a more 
complicated and risky business than was understood ... in Berman"; the 
task now "is to introduce into legal aesthetics the mid-course corrections 
248. See VIEW FROM THE CAMPIDOGLIO, supra note 193, at 66-67. 
[I]deas ... promoted by Modern architects ... concern aesthetic unity: simple 
forms and pure order are the only good, and the architect ... will lead the 
community toward these goals. . . . [W]e are ending up with total con-
trol---total control through design review boards which promote high design, 
exclude popular architecture and in the process discourage quality in any 
architecture and stultify the diversity and hierarchy which have always been 
part of a balanced and vital community architecture. 
Id.; see also VENTURI, supra note 125, at 165 ("Beauty escapes in the pursuit of safety, 
which promotes a simplistic sameness over a varied vitality. It withers under the edicts 
of today's aging architectural revolutionaries who man the review boards and who have 
achieved aesthetic certainty."). 
249. Malcolm Quantrill, Venturi: Pragmatism and/or Empiricism, BUILDING, July 
21, 1972, at 87. 
250. See COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 104. 
(I]n some of these compositions there is an inherent sense of unity not far 
from the surface. It is not the obvious or easy unity derived from the 
dominant binder or the motival order of simpler, less contradictory composi-
tions, but that derived from a complex and illusive order of the difficult whole. 
It is the taut composition which contains contrapuntal relationships, equal 
combinations, inflected fragments, and acknowledged dualities. . . . In the 
validly complex building or cityscape, the eye does not want to be too easily 
or too quickly satisfied in its search for unity within a whole. 
Id.; see also View from the Campidoglio, supra note 104, at 116 ([Venturi's mother's 
house], "though Classical, is not pure. Within the Classical aesthetic it conforms to a 
Mannerist tradition which admits contradiction within the ideal order and thereby 
enhances the ideal quality of that order through contrast with it. To perceive the ideal 
you must acknowledge the real."). 
25 l. COSTONIS, supra note 88, at 92. 
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indicated by post-Berman experience."252 The next section will 
propose a correction which calls for nothing more than the application 
of precedent to give the exterior design of a single-family house the 
same First Amendment protection given non-obscene live nude dancing. 
VI. 
As even the brief review conducted above demonstrates, cases 
involving municipal aesthetic regulation of single-family houses look 
like a quagmire, at least from the bench. Pre-Berman, most courts flatly 
said aesthetics were not acceptable as the sole basis for municipal action; 
post-Berman, most courts have flatly said that aesthetic determinations 
were for the municipalities to make. Pre- and post-, the courts have 
elected not to act. 253 
The quagmire is that "in the realm of aesthetic regulation," courts 
"have no choice but to weigh competing interests; yet there is no unit of 
measurement common to the interests being weighed."254 It is, as one 
early analyst pointed out, "a pity that aesthetic disagreements cannot be 
resolved by reference to absolute standards, for we should all feel so 
much more secure in our judgments."255 However, as a later analyst 
concluded: 
A legislature will rarely be able to articulate standards, directed toward a purely 
aesthetic goal, that will effectively channel the board's decisionmaking; the 
agency, by a sequence of adjudications, will rarely be able to construct 
meaningful "common law" standards against which subsequent decisions may 
be measured for consistency; and procedural devices ... will rarely play any 
meaningful role in legitimizing the agency's decision. As a result, there is a 
high risk that the agency's judgments will be either beyond the legislative intent 
or arbitrary or both.256 
The quagmire becomes even stickier if the exterior design of a single-
family house is accepted as having First Amendment content.257 
Does the statement that there are no absolute standards mean that there 
are no standards at all? Not according to Robert Venturi. He is a 
responsible revolutionary, carefully aware that architecture has the power 
252. Id. at xvii. 
253. See Williams, supra note 142, at 4-5; J. F. Ghent, Annotation, Aesthetic 
Objectives or Considerations as Affecting Validity of Zoning Ordinance, 21 A.L.R.3D 
1222 (1968); Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Zoning 
Ordinance Regulating Architectural Style or Design of Structure, 41 A.L.R.3D 1397 
(1972). 
254. Williams, supra note 142, at 34. 
255. J. J. Dukeminier Jr., Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 218, 229 (1955). 
256. Williams, supra note 142, at 19. 
257. See Smith, supra note I 8 I, at 80 I n.42. 
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to "enhance or impair" our surroundings, that "the introduction of any 
new building will change the character of all the other elements in a 
scene."258 Or, as another architect put it, "[i]t is not enough to share 
a language; there must be propriety in the conversation."259 And, if 
anything, Venturi is an architect of propriety, who knows that "[i]f order 
without expediency breeds formalism, expediency without order ... 
means chaos," who cautions that no architect "can belittle the role of 
order as a way of seeing a whole relevant to its own characteristics and 
context."260 
Venturi is a revolutionary of revival rather than an iconoclast; he 
prefers to 
work through analogy, symbol, and image . . . and . . . derive insights, 
analogies, and stimulation from unexpected images. There is perversity in the 
learning process: We look backwards at history and tradition to go forward; we 
can also look downward to go upward. And withholding judgment may be used 
as a tool to make later judgment more sensitive. This is a way of learning from 
everything. 261 
And, in learning from the past, Venturi says architects can develop a 
new "[r]hetoric for our landscape" which, "when it is appropriate, will 
come from a less formal and more symbolic medium than pure 
architecture. "262 Venturi 's inclusive architecture "rejects that heroic 
stance which orthodox modern architecture assumed to itself as the 
source of cultural values in favor of a more modest and flexible position 
258. Robert Venturi, The Campidog/io: A Case Study, in VIEW FROM THE 
CAMPIDOGLIO, supra note l 04, at 12. 
259. RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 120, at 90. The author believes that, "builders must 
learn the local language---if not, they will be outsiders, architectural tourists. . . . It is 
not too fanciful to extend this metaphor and imagine that buildings in groups, sharing 
such a language, converse." Id. 
260. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 41. 
261. VENTURI ET AL., supra note 125, at 3; see also RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 114, 
at 249. 
Id. 
An investigation of classical architecture around the world demonstrates that 
universal solutions and local needs can be compatible .... [C]lassicism offers 
architects a canon, but it is a liberal and tolerant one. It has provided its 
practitioners with an architectural language that is rooted in the past but 
adaptable to the present. It is amenable to modification and crossbreeding, and 
in talented hands can respond successfully to new building programs. . . . [l]t 
lacks the absolutism and rigidity that characterize the modernist approach to 
building. 
262. Venturi, supra note 193, at 67. 
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in which architecture embodies the values which society, not just other 
architects, values and supports."263 
Where is the threat in this? For, undeniably, Venturi's words and 
works have been considered a threat. A threat to what? To an 
established sense of what was expected in architecture; Venturi 
transgressed the exclusionist dogma of modem architectural theory by 
denying its absolutes.264 Although he respected order, he argued that 
"[m]eaning can be enhanced by breaking the order; the exception points 
up the rule. A building with no 'imperfect' part can have no perfect 
part, because contrast supports meaning. An artful discord gives vitality 
to architecture."265 Venturi broke with theories which idealize and 
generalize; he created rather than conformed;266 he brought forward 
architecture's "complexities and contradictions of content and mean-
ing";267 he made the viewer a reader of multiple rather than simplistic 
levels of meaning. He reacted against conforming rules and regulations, 
discarded the confining uniformity, and, in the process, gave his 
homeowners liberation and freedom of expression. 
What Venturi has done is what the Stoyanoffs and Ms. Reid wanted 
to do. He has put what appear to be aliens in the midst of what review 
boards consider to be icons.268 Those terms are John Costonis'. He 
263. ROBERT A. M. STERN, NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN ARCHITECTURE 8 
(I 969); see also RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 114, at xvi (noting that, "the task of evaluating 
the success or failure of a building is not an easy one. A building succeeds------0r 
fails------0n many different levels: as a practical object as well as a beautiful one, as a 
work of art, but also as a setting for life."). 
264. See Levine, supra note 108, at 56; see also VENTURI ET AL., supra note 125, 
at 53. 
Id. 
These [images) show the vitality that may be achieved by an architecture of 
inclusion or, by contrast, the deadness that results from too great a preoccupa-
tion with tastefulness and total design .... Allusion and comment, on the past 
or present or on our great commonplaces or old cliches, and the inclusion of 
the everyday in the environment, sacred and profane-these are what are 
lacking in present-day Modern architecture. We can learn about them from 
Las Vegas as have other artists from their own profane and stylistic sources. 
265. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 41; see also James 
Steele, The House as Microcosm and Macrocosm, in VENTURI, SCOTT BROWN & 
ASSOCIATES ON HOUSES AND HOUSING 15 (I 992) (noting Venturi's "tendency to 'impair 
the perfection' of Modernist norms" in his housing designs). 
266. See VENTURI ET AL., supra note 125, at 129. 
267. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 25. 
268. See COSTONIS, supra note 88, at 53-54. 
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Architects, urban designers, and others who double as publicists for their 
creations comprise another group of tastemakers. . . . Robert Venturi [is] 
among these two-hatters. As designers they shape images that debut as aliens 
and, with time, struggle, and luck, may end up as icons. . . . As publicists 
they find themselves caught in the squeeze between the instinct for creativity 
native to their craft and the anxious conservatism of groups fearful of 
[VOL. 33: 291, 1996] Constitutional Architecture 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
defines icons as "features invested with values that confirm our sense of 
order and identity."269 Aliens "threaten the icons and hence our 
investment in the icons' values."27° For Costonis, aesthetic laws are 
justified by "our individual and social needs for stability and reassurance 
in the face of environmental changes that we perceive as threats to these 
values."271 Such laws are justified if assigned a "role as a regulator 
of change in the symbolic environment."272 However, to be consonant 
with the First Amendment values, such regulation "will be shaped by an 
evaluation of the community's claims that icon and alien actually are 
dissonant and that this dissonance truly threatens (poses a 'clear and 
present danger' to) the stability of the community's land use pat-
tems."273 
Architecture is entitled to First Amendment protection; in the case of 
a single-family house, it is entitled to the same protection as Ms. Gilleo 
was given in posting her sign. The exterior design of the house is 
speech; it can be read by its viewers. The landowner's choice of an 
exterior design cannot be suppressed simply because a municipality finds 
it grotesque or appalling or unsightly. If that is the objection, then the 
viewers must simply tum their heads. 
That is what the Supreme Court said about those who might have been 
offended by Harold Spence's peace symbol flag which he hung from the 
window of his apartment in Seattle. That is also what the Court said 
about those who were offended by the films being shown at Richard 
Id. 
environmental change. 
269. Id. at xv-xvi. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. at xv. 
272. Id. at 19. 
Icons always precede the legal regime that shelters them. Law [does not 
create J ... the powerful bonds between these icons and their constituencies. 
Law entered the picture only when summoned by these constituencies .... [A) 
profile of the icon's character affords a framework for identifying aliens even 
in advance of their appearance because the aesthetics regime's focus is the 
dissonance between the two. 
Id. at 58. 
273. Id. at 99. "First Amendment values are not put at risk by the menace that 
aliens pose for icons. On the contrary, these values are threatened by the government's 
effort to forestall that menace by censoring 'offensive' aliens, some of which do merit 
constitutional status as speech." Id. at 94. 
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Erznoznik's drive-in theater in Jacksonville, Florida.274 A municipal 
ordinance prohibited "exhibiting a motion picture, visible from public 
streets, in which 'female buttocks and bare breasts were shown. ,,ms 
When challenged, the municipality argued "that it may protect its 
citizens against unwilling exposure to materials that may be offen-
sive."276 
In response, the Court said that "when the government, acting as 
censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of 
speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the First 
Amendment strictly limits its power."277 A municipality may shield 
citizens from speech only upon a showing that "substantial privacy 
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner."278 
However, "[t]he plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our 
pluralistic society, constantly proliferating new and ingenious forms of 
expression, 'we are inescapably captive audiences for many 
purposes' "279: 
Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral, 
sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit government to 
decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to 
require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather ... the burden 
normally falls upon the viewer to "avoid further bombardment of [his] 
sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes. "280 
Jacksonville's ordinance did not "satisfy the rigorous contitutional 
standards that apply when government attempts to regulate expres-
sion."281 The ordinance lacked the essential "precision of drafting and 
clarity of purpose" to pass First Amendment scrutiny.282 
When a municipality seeks, in the guise of aesthetic regulation, to 
regulate the First Amendment speech represented by the exterior design 
of a single-family house, it should be required to do two things: first, 
provide narrow, clearly defined aesthetic standards by which architects, 
landowners, reviewing agencies, and courts can evaluate a proposed 
design; and, second, when called to account for rejecting a proposed 
design, provide reasons for its action, reasons which relate directly to 
furthering a sufficiently substantial municipal interest. It is not enough 
274. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
275. Id. at 206. 
276. Id. at 208. 
277. Id. at 209. 
278. Id. at 210 (quoting Cohen v. Cal., 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). 
279. Id. at 210 (quoting Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970)). 
280. Id. at 210-11 (quoting Cohen v. Cal., 403 U.S. at 21) (alteration in original). 
281. Id. at 217. 
282. Id. at 21 7- I 8. 
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for a municipality to say that it does not like what the structure says; it 
must show that the message measurably affects a sufficiently substantial 
municipal interest.283 This is no more than what Schad required the 
municipality to do when it tried to ban non-obscene live nude dancing. 
There is no constitutional place for a municipality's aesthetic 
inquisition conducted because it believes the exterior design of a single-
family house located on private property reflects an architectural 
heresy.284 The "urge to enforce similarity" must "be supplanted by an 
283. Compare Sheldon E. Steinbach, Aesthetic Zoning: Property Values and the 
Judicial Decision Process, 35 Mo. L. REV. 176, 1 77 (I 970): 
The reluctance of courts, as well as certain segments of the public, to accept 
aesthetics as the sole basis for zoning stems from a reverence for the historic 
rights of private property. Put in the least favorable light, aesthetic zoning 
may be considered as the exercise of the police power to restrain an individual 
in the use of his private property so that the community may have the luxury 
of gazing upon pleasant surroundings. Many feel that the property owner 
should not be compelled to bear the financial burden of making the community 
beautiful but instead that the community itself should pay for preserving the 
beauty of the community. In addition, judges and laymen alike look with 
disfavor upon the uncertainty caused by the use of aesthetic standards in 
drafting legislation. Certainly it is not an idle fear that the lack of precise 
standards may lead to discriminatory enforcement. 
(citations omitted) with Dukeminier, Jr., supra note 255, at 236: 
If we want our children to grow up in pleasant purlieus, we must give up 
something of the freedom of the individual to use his land as he chooses. This 
is inherent in the concept of land planning by community officials. Neverthe-
less, I do not wish to leave the impression that I think it either necessary or 
desirable that community officials be arbiters in all questions of aesthetic 
preference which crop up from the use of land. According to our basic social 
hypothesis, they should interfere only when individual use seriously hampers 
the achievement of community goals. If community officials instigate an 
artistic inquisition, it is certainly the court's duty to oppose it, but the cases do 
not suggest that community officials have acted rashly in attempting to 
improve appearances. 
284. See Steinbach, supra note 283, at 186. 
Certainly beauty can be established without cheese box uniformity for an 
entire community. Yet, aesthetic concepts incorporated in construction and 
zoning ordinances impinge on individual freedom to utilize property in a 
manner contrary to the will of the community. Perhaps today's non-
conformity, which may be termed architectural heresy, may be tomorrow's 
orthodoxy. As such, it should have its place within today's plan for the 
implementation of aesthetic considerations in zoning. 
Id.; see also Bret Rappaport, As Natural Landscaping Takes Root We Must Weed Out 
Bad Laws-How Natural Landscaping and Leopold's Land Ethic Collide With 
Unenlightened Weed Laws and What Must Be Done About It, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 
865 (1993). 
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anti-assimilation principle."285 There must be "a shift from the goal 
of uniformity to an ideal of equivalence," an ideal which "captures the 
essence of a relationship in which two things maintain their essential 
differentness while asserting a compelling claim to equal significance 
and respect. "286 
A demand that municipalities provide narrowly and clearly defined 
aesthetic standards is not a demand for castles in the air. It can be done. 
It must be done to avoid unreviewable exercises of municipal discretion. 
This is illustrated by Anderson v. City of lssaquah.287 The landowner 
sought a permit for a commercial building on Gilman Boulevard in 
Issaquah, Washington. Although the building conformed to all other 
zoning regulations, the landowner, despite repeated efforts over nine 
months and the expenditure of $250,000, was unable to satisfy the 
review board that his proposal was "sensitive to the unique character" of 
Gilman Boulevard, a street which the review board described as 
lssaquah's "Signature Street."288 
The board acted under an ordinance designed "to protect, preserve and 
enhance the social, cultural, economic, environmental, and aesthetic 
values that have established the desirable quality and unique character 
of Issaquah."289 The remainder of the ordinance was no more specif-
Ultimately, the aesthetic argument against natural landscaping is illogical. 
One man's weed is another man's rose. To some, pink plastic flamingoes, 
polka-dotted bloomered cardboard ladies, twirling plastic sunflowers, astro-turf-
covered front stoops, and perfectly sculpted evergreens look simply ridiculous; 
but to others, such landscaping is beautiful. People have a right to astro-turf-
covered stoops, closely cropped evergreens, and spinning plastic sunflowers in 
their yards. That is the American way. But individuals also have the right to 
a natural stone walkway, free-flowing native shrubs and forbs, and real 
sunflowers reaching to the sky in a blaze of gold. 
(Citation omitted). Id. at 927. 
285. Fitzgerald, supra note 90, at 2065-66. 
286. Id. at 2066; see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of 
Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2350 (1995), reversing a state order requiring parade organizers 
to include a group imparting a message with which the organizers disagreed: 
The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce 
thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, 
grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a proposal 
to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression. The Speech Clause has 
no more certain antithesis. While the law is free to promote all sorts of 
conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for 
no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a 
disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government. 
(Citations omitted). Earlier, the Court had noted that "this use of the State's power 
violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker 
has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message." Id. at 2348. 
287. 851 P.2d 744 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). 
288. Id. at 748. 
289. Id. at 748-49 n.3. 
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ic.290 The court found that "these code sections 'do not give effective 
or meaningful guidance'to applicants, to design professionals, or to the 
public officials ... who are responsible for enforcing the code."291 
Those charged with enforcement "were left with only their own 
individual, subjective 'feelings' about the 'image of Issa~uah' and as to 
whether this project was 'compatible' or 'interesting."'29 
The court concluded that the sections under consideration were 
unconstitutional on their face. They were also unconstitutional as 
applied to the landowner. 293 The court insisted that "[a] design review 
ordinance must contain workable guidelines," guidelines which the 
amicus curiae brief-submitted by three architectural societ-
ies---<lemonstrated could be established in a municipal ordinance. 294 
Although acknowledging that "aesthetic standards are an appropriate 
component of land use governance," the court said such standards 
can and must be drafted to give clear guidance to all parties concerned. 
Applicants must have an understandable statement of what is expected from 
new construction. Design professionals need to know in advance what 
standards will be acceptable in a given community. It is unreasonable to expect 
applicants to pay for repetitive revisions of plans in an effort to comply with the 
290. As the court noted: 
an ordinary citizen reading these sections would learn only that a given 
building project should bear a good realtionship with the Issaquah Valley and 
surrounding mountains; its windows, doors, eaves, and parapets should be of 
"appropriate proportions", its colors should be "harmonious" and seldom 
"bright" or "brilliant"; its mechanical equipment should be screened from 
public view; its exterior lighting should be "harmonious" with the building 
design and "monotony should be avoided." The project should also be 
"interesting." ... "Harmony in texture, lines, and masses (is] encouraged." 
Id. at 751 (citation omitted) (quoting I.M.C. 16.16.060). 
Id. 
291. Id. (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae). 
292. Id. at 752. 
293. The court found that the: 
commissioners enforced not a building design code but their own arbitrary 
concept of the provisions of an unwritten "statement" to be made on Gilman 
Boulevard. The commissioners' individual concepts were as vague and 
undefined as those written in the code. This is the very epitome of discretion-
ary, arbitrary enforcement of the law. 
294. Id. at 754. The court said the amicus brief "well illustrated" that "aesthetic 
considerations are not impossible to define in a code or ordinance." Id. at 753. The 
appendices to the brief included portions of municipal ordinances which: "contain 
extensive written criteria illustrated by schematic drawings and photographs. The 
illustrations clarify a number of concepts which otherwise might be difficult to describe 
with the requisite degree of clarity." Id. n. 14. 
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unarticulated, unpublished "statements" a given community may wish to make 
on or off its "signature street". It is equally unreasonable, and a deprivation of 
due process, to expect or allow a design review board ... to create standards 
on an ad hoc basis, during the design review process. 295 
This Article has argued that the First Amendment content of the 
exterior design of a single-family house requires a municipality to 
narrowly and clearly articulate the aesthetic standards to be used in 
evaluating the proposed design; the First Amendment also requires that 
the municipality carry the burden of demonstrating that the denial or 
conditioning of a building permit is necessary to "further a sufficiently 
substantial government interest."296 When First Amendment interests 
are implicated, the courts cannot apply the usual deferential analysis 
which places the burden on the party challenging the regulation to prove 
that it constitutes an arbitrary regulation of property rights.297 When 
a municipality applies aesthetic standards to deny or restrict a private 
landowner's construction or alteration of a single-family house, the 
burden properly rests on the municipality to justify its interference by 
adequate evidence of a substantial governmental interest being advanced 
by the application of narrow, clearly defined standards. 
VII. 
Robert Venturi believes that to be vital as well as valid, architecture 
must embrace "contradiction as well as complexity."298 He has 
demonstrated in his writing and his buildings that variety is preferable 
to conformity, that "there is room for, and need for," a "catholicity of 
... taste" in our landscape.299 Our landscape should "embrace 
295. Id. at 755. 
296. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981). 
297. See id. 
298. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 16; see also Scully, 
supra note 115, at 10. 
Id. 
Many species of high quality can inhabit the same world. Such multiplicity 
is indeed the highest promise of the modern age to mankind, far more intrinsic 
to its nature than the superficial conformity or equally arbitrary packaging 
which its first stages suggest and which are so eagerly embraced by superficial 
designers. 
299. Venturi, supra note 193, at 66. 
Id. 
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A connoisseur of music will pride himself on the catholicity of his taste .... 
Why will this person accept in his own living room ... what he will not 
accept in the landscape? . . . Why will he condemn pop architecture and 
accept pop music? . . . [T]here is room for, and need for, a hierarchy of 
musical forms in our lives. Why not the same thing for architectural forms in 
our landscapes? 
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continuity and discontinuity ... clarity and ambiguity, cooperation and 
competition, the community and rugged individualism."300 
Although arguing that architecture has "no fixed laws," Venturi 
acknowledges that "not everything will work in a building or a city"; the 
architect "must determine what must be made to work and what it is 
possible to compromise with, what will give in, and where and 
how."301 His argument favoring architectural complexity and contra-
diction has extended architecture's vocabulary. The resulting "freedom 
from consistency and the opportunity for diversity ... are important: 
inherent in them is sensibility to place, time, and culture, and recognition 
of the multiplicity and relativity of tastes."302 Venturi's "return to a 
more traditional language in architecture" has given architects "a great 
deal more freedom to make richly expressive buildings with individual 
character" and "has produced evocative and eloquent public build-
ings."101 
Language and architecture are related, inextricably. Venturi, in 
recognizing that, saw that it was "time to stop groping for a universal 
language, admit the confusion and start working to make a 'rich mix' of 
the polyglot .... "304 He gave "architectural thinking the most angular 
shove it had received in half a century: away from beautiful, unitary, 
abstract form, toward linguistic variety and an ironic, mildly dandified 
awareness of history and how to quote it."305 His shove did not create 
a domino effect leading to architectural anarchy: "Unity is not meant to 
be easy, ... nor is diversity synonomous with disintegration. Difference 
is as great a civic virtue as justice, faith or grandeur."306 
Venturi is a responsible revolutionary, reviving lessons from the past 
rather than simply razing a current ideology. His "architecture of 
complexity and contradiction has a special obligation toward the whole," 
embodying "the difficult unity of inclusion rather than the easy unity of 
300. VENTURI ET AL., supra note 125, at 20. 
30 I. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 41. 
302. VIEW FROM THE CAMPODOGLIO, supra note 104, at 108. 
303. RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 114, at 265. 
304. Fowler, supra note 117, at 433. 
305. Hughes, supra note 116, at 57, see also Christian Norberg-Schulz, Less or 
More, ARCHITECTURAL REV., Apr. 1968, at 257 (noting Venturi's "substantial 
contribution to the development of an architectural grammar"). 
306. Herbert Muschamp, Democratic Decorations at Bard College, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 31, 1993, at H42. 
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exclusion."307 Venturi's buildings have an "authenticity of ... linkage 
to their respective environments, combined with which they constitute 
a 'perceptual whole. '"308 
For many, including me, Venturi's position is most clearly expressed 
in his single-family houses. It is in this work that Venturi most clearly 
communicates his love of the art, his respect for the client, and his 
sensitivity toward the community.309 His houses are meant to be 
inhabited and made alive by those who live within, who infuse a 
particular site with their presence, their activities, their possessions, their 
aspirations, and their dreams.310 His houses are a delight for occupant 
and viewer, houses which, in not seeking to be revolutionary, have 
sparked a revolution.311 
That revolution was one for tolerance and accomodation; for 
acceptance of variety in what is considered acceptable in the exterior 
design of single-family houses; for recognition of that design's capacity 
to speak on behalf of the inhabitants. Venturi celebrates, as did the 
Gilleo Court, our culture's "special respect for individual liberty in the 
home," a principle which "has special resonance when the government 
seeks to constrain a person's ability to speak there."312 What this 
Article has argued is that the house's exterior design has the same ability 
to speak as did Ms. Gilleo 's 8.5 by 11 inch sign protesting the Gulf 
War. That exterior design, like that sign, is "an important and distinct 
medium of expression" which can "both reflect and animate change in 
the life of a community" and which can "provide information about the 
307. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 16. 
308. VON Moos, supra note IOI, at 13. 
309. See Goldberger, supra note 150, at H27. 
310. See RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 120, at 171. 
311. See R YBCZYNSKI, supra note 114, at 287. 
The concern that the architect shares with the artist is beauty. . . . But 
beauty is not reserved only for masterpieces. It is----or should be-present in 
all works of architecture. . . . Architectural beauty-perhaps delight is a better 
word-often has an everyday quality that is undramatic but precious. 
Id.; see also Denise S. Brown, On Houses and Housing, in VENTURI SCOTT BROWN & 
ASSOCIATES ON HOUSES AND HOUSING 10, 13 (1992). 
ID. 
Looking back on [Venturi's mother's] house in the context of the heroic and 
original late Modernism of the 60s . . . we realise its most significant 
characteristic might be that it looks like a house. It is not original, not heroic, 
but rather, conventional and ordinary, in it specific, not implicit, references. 
In not being revolutionary it is astonishingly revolutionary. 
312. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2047 (1994). 
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identity of the 'speaker"' to "an audience that could not be reached 
nearly as well by other means."313 
When a municipality seeks to restrict that speech, it should be held to 
the standard applied in Schad where the zoning ordinance sought to ban 
non-obscene live nude dancing; "when a zoning law infringes upon a 
protected liberty, it must be narrowly drawn and must further a 
sufficiently substantial government interest."314 And, as in Schad, the 
burdens of production and persuasion should be placed on the municipal-
ity.31s 
We must remember that a house is more than a shelter.316 It is a 
statement for the people who live there, an expression for themselves 
and to others of who they are and how they choose to live. It is an 
expression made as clearly as if written or spoken and just as clearly 
entitled to First Amendment protection. 
3 I 3. Id. at 2045-46; see also Paul Goldberger, Moore's House Divided, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 20, 1994, at Cl ("To build a house, the architect Charles Moore once wrote, 'you 
bind the goods and trappings of your life together with your dreams to make a place that 
is uniquely your own."') 
314. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981). A municipality 
may act to control the secondary effects generated by otherwise protected First 
Amendment activity if the "ordinance is designed to serve a substantial governmental 
interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication." City of Renton 
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986). 
3 I 5. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 71. 
[W]hen the government intrudes on one of the liberties protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "this Court must examine 
carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent 
to which they are served by the challenged regulation." Because the ordinance 
challenged . . . significantly limits communicative activity within the 
[municipality], we must scrutinize both the interests advanced by the 
[municipality] to justify this limitation on protected expression and the means 
chosen to further those interests. 
Id. (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499 (1977)). 
3 I 6. See R YBCZYNSKI, supra note I 20, at 66-67, describing 
the unique nature of the art of building, an art of compromise which unites the 
beautiful with the practical, the ideal with the possible, the ephemeral with the 
concrete. . . . Unlike [other creative endeavors] which produce objects in 
space, buildings contain space. Moreover, it is space that is intended not only 
to be experienced and admired but also to be inhabited. Making space is a 
social art; and although architecture consists of individual works, these are 
always parts of a larger context---0f a landscape, of other buildings, of a street, 
and, finally, of our everyday lives. 
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